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Denial-of-Service attacks continue to grow in size and frequency despite serious under-
reporting. While several research solutions have been proposed over the years, they have had
important deployment hurdles that have prevented them from seeing any signiﬁcant level of
deployment on the Internet. Commercial solutions exist, but they are costly and generally are
not meant to scale to Internet-wide levels.
In this thesis we present three ﬁltering architectures against large Denial-of-Service at-
tacks. Their emphasis is in providing an effective solution against such attacks while using
simple mechanisms in order to overcome the deployment hurdles faced by other solutions.
While these are well-suited to being implemented in fast routing hardware, in the early stages
of deployment this is unlikely to be the case. Because of this, we implemented them on low-cost
off-the-shelf hardware and evaluated their performance on a network testbed. The results are
very encouraging: this setup allows us to forward trafﬁc on a single PC at rates of millions of
packets per second even for minimum-sized packets, while at the same time processing as many
as one million ﬁlters; this gives us conﬁdence that the architecture as a whole could combat even
the large botnets currently being reported. Better yet, we show that this single-PC performance
scales well with the number of CPU cores and network interfaces, which is promising for our
solutions if we consider the current trend in processor design.
In addition to using simple mechanisms, we discuss how the architectures provide clear
incentives for ISPs that adopt them early, both at the destination as well as at the sources of
attacks. The hope is that these will be sufﬁcient to achieve some level of initial deployment.
The larger goal is to have an architectural solution against large DoS deployed in place before
even more harmful attacks take place; this thesis is hopefully a step in that direction.
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viiChapter 1
Introduction
From its inception, the Internet was designed to efﬁciently transfer packets and to be ﬂexible
enough so that it could accommodate future applications. Dating back to its early days as the
ARPAnet, trust was placed on users not to abuse the network, and so security was not, until
recently, of great concern. The Internet has evolved signiﬁcantly since those early days, and
people have become used to depending on it for a large variety of activities, from long distance
voice and video communications to online banking, e-government and online shopping. How-
ever, this increase in activity, specially regarding economic transactions, has made the Internet
attractive to the criminal sector, and so the assumption that users can be trusted no longer holds.
While it would be impractical and unrealistic to completely revamp the current Internet to
make it secure against attack, it is possible to design incrementally-deployable solutions so that
the Internet can continue to grow unhindered.
1.1 Deﬁnitions
In a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, an attacker tries to exhaust one or more resources from a
victim so that it cannot service its legitimate clients. Resources that can be attacked range from
a server’s CPU and memory to its network capacity. DoS attacks can consist of exploiting a
software bug, causing a server to crash, or ﬂooding it with trafﬁc to overwhelm it.
Since it would be difﬁcult for an attacker to exhaust a server’s resources using only his
system, he can use worms or other malicious software to take over the systems of other un-
suspecting hosts, turning them into “bots” that do his bidding. Attacks involving such bots are
called Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks (DDoS) and can be quite harmful depending on the
size of the botnet used to perpetrate them. DDoS attacks are particularly effective at performing
ﬂooding attacks, in which the victim (or even its network link) becomes saturated by attack
trafﬁc.
One variation on the DoS theme is called a reﬂection attack, in which the attacker sendsa packet to a server but spoofs the source by putting the target’s address instead of his in the
header; theserverthenreplies, butthistrafﬁcendsupgoingtothevictimratherthantheattacker.
This attack is usually coupled with an ampliﬁcation attack, in which the reﬂection server sends
replies that are substantially bigger than the requests that triggered them.
1.2 Problem Description and Motivation
Despite serious under-reporting, the number and size of ﬂooding DoS attacks are growing at an
alarming rate. ISPs are under constant pressure to upgrade access speeds, often leaving little
time to implement security measures: it is precisely these high-speed yet largely unmonitored
links that provide a powerful base from which to launch attacks. This, combined with a contin-
uous stream of exploits, ensures that attacks will keep growing both in number and size. In its
biannual report [56], Symantec reported an average of 5,200 attacks per day for the ﬁrst half of
2007, and these only included TCP SYN request ﬂood attacks. Arbor Network’s annual survey
of tier-1 and tier-2 security engineers reports that DDoS attacks are reaching new heights of
trafﬁc, up to 40 Gb/s in the past year [53].
The character of these attacks is also changing. While in the beginning they were mostly
perpetrated by amateurs seeking to boast about their personal achievements, recent years have
seen a shift towards more sinister and diverse motives. In the more common DoS attack, a
company’s links are ﬂooded and a ransom note sent demanding payment in exchange for having
the attack stop; not paying the ransom can have drastic consequences [50]. Despite under-
reporting (companies are loathe to advertise the fact that they have paid, lest they invite future
attacks), these types of attacks are on the rise [41]. Other ﬁnancially-motivated attacks are
perpetrated by businesses trying to eliminate or gain an advantage over their competitors [45].
Further, attacks can be motivated by political reasons [9], ideological reasons [44] and can be
even caused by implementation mistakes [59].
Botnet size is also increasing: reports from 2005 indicate that Dutch bot-herders may
have controlled as many as 1.5 million hosts [65], while a more recent report states that a
gang’s botnet included almost two million bots [38]. To make matters worse, shutting these
down will become increasingly difﬁcult, since their command-and-control servers are starting
to be structured on a peer-to-peer model. Certain security techniques such as Address-space
LayoutRandomization(ASLR)areaimedatpreventingexploits. However, researchhasalready
demonstratedthatASLRslowstheattackdown, butdoesnotpreventit[51]; andofcourse, there
are many older systems connected to the Internet that do not implement these new techniques,
and so are vulnerable. In addition to this, attackers will always be able to exploit machines by
2using email, P2P and other social engineering techniques [56]. We believe that these factors
ensure that botnets will be around for a long time to come.
Designing defenses against large, distributed attacks is intrinsically difﬁcult for several
reasons. First, while the core of the network would seem like the perfect location to place
defense mechanisms, ISPs there have few if any direct incentives to deploy new measures.
Further, change in the core is likely to require hardware change to core routers. Even if re-
conﬁguring routers is all that is needed, operators are generally reluctant to make important
modiﬁcations without clear incentives. Second, defenses implemented at the client hosts are
just as problematic. Unless such defenses were hardware-based, it is likely that they could be
broken or exploited by an attacker. Third, source address spooﬁng complicates matters fur-
ther, making the task of tracing the sources of malicious trafﬁc difﬁcult. In addition, any DoS
defense mechanism that does not take spooﬁng into account can be subverted by an attacker
into denying service to an unsuspecting victim, turning the mechanism into a DoS tool in its
own right. Fourth, any proposed solution must be ﬂexible enough to allow the development
and deployment of new applications, one of the main reasons behind the Internet’s amazing
growth. Finally, any practical solution needs to provide clear incentives for initial deployment
or it will fail regardless of technical merit. Despite these difﬁculties, steps must be taken to at
least mitigate these attacks so that the Internet can continue to expand.
1.3 Requirements
It is clear that the DoS problem will not disappear but rather continue to grow. It is also clear
that to effectively defend against DDoS attacks, malicious trafﬁc must be blocked close to
its sources. Although OS security is improving, end-hosts themselves are likely to remain
poorly managed and insecure for the foreseeable future, so any solution must be network-based.
Unfortunately, we cannot enlist the help of the network core; the cost of any mechanism in core
routers is signiﬁcantly greater than at the edges. Perhaps more importantly, transit ISPs actually
suffer very little from DDoS problems, so have very little incentive to invest in new technologies
or even perform router reconﬁgurations. This leads us to the inevitable conclusion that the only
place where these problems can be tackled is at the edge ISPs and networks; only here does
anyone have both the incentive and the means to tackle the problem.
Although a number of pro-active solutions to DDoS have been proposed, none can be
deployed solely at edge ISPs with no changes to hosts or to core routers. Thus it appears that
any IP-level solution that is actually realistic for deployment must also be reactive: essentially
detect problem trafﬁc and request that it stop. Such a ﬁltering mechanism must be designed
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to prevent misuse. For example, it must not be possible for spoofed trafﬁc to trigger a ﬁlter
to be installed that blocks legitimate trafﬁc. In addition, the ﬁltering mechanism itself must be
robust against DDoS. As far as possible, this implies that its control plane should be relatively
decoupled from the data forwarding path. If, for whatever reason, the ﬁltering control plane
were to fail, the situation must not be worse than if the DoS solution had not been deployed.
From this discussion arise the following requirements for a solution:
 Must be able to mitigate even large, distributed attacks
 Must be deployable in the current Internet without changes to end-hosts or core routers
 Must not be possible to use it as a DoS tool
 Must have the right incentives for deployment
 Must allow for future innovation
 Must achieve all of these with minimal mechanism
1.4 Thesis Overview
In this thesis we present three different and novel architectures against DDoS attacks that aim
to meet the requirements mentioned in the previous section. Chapter 2 covers related work
both from the research and commercial ﬁelds, and explains why despite several years of efforts
we are still not any closer to deploying solutions that meet the requirements discussed above.
Chapter 3 presents the three proposed architectures, giving a detailed explanation of how each
of them works. Chapter 4 provides a detailed investigation of the baseline performance of the
platform used for the implementation of the architectures’ elements. Chapter 5 discusses the
implementation of the various elements of each of the architectures, presenting performance
results obtained using off-the-shelf hadware on a real network testbed. Chapter 6 analyses
these results, comparing the architectures and discussing remaining issues. Finally, chapter ??
concludes.
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Related Work
Despite several years of effort both in the research community and in the commercial ﬁeld,
Denial-of-Service attacks continue to grow in frequency, size and effectiveness. This section
discusses why the proposed solutions have failed to deal with the problem.
2.1 Research Community
While Denial-of-Service attacks have gained considerable notoriety recently, they have existed
since the late 1990s. As a result, research in the ﬁeld has produced numerous and varied
schemes aimed at solving or at least mitigating the effects of these attacks, specially those
of large, distributed DoS attacks. The discussion that follows is organized using a taxonomy
of complete solutions or components that simplify the problem. While some of the proposed
approaches do not cleanly fall into one of these categories, many do, and so this classiﬁcation
provides a useful organizational aid.
2.1.1 Trafﬁc Policing and Filtering
Once a large attack has aggregated at a target, there is little the victim can do but drop the mali-
cious packets. For sufﬁciently large attacks, the processing power needed to do so may exceed
the capabilities of the target. Trafﬁc policing aims to alleviate the burden on the victim, either
by having network routers ﬁlter or rate-limit attack trafﬁc before it becomes fully aggregated,
or by preventing this trafﬁc from entering the network in the ﬁrst place.
Pushback [35] consists of a local mechanism designed to detect and control aggregates
at a single router. The router begins by deciding whether or not it is congested by periodically
monitoring each queue’s packet drop rate to see if it exceeds a certain threshold (this threshold is
policy-speciﬁc). An aggregate is deﬁned as a collection of packets from one or more ﬂows that
have some property in common, like TCP SYN packets. When serious congestion is detected,
the router attempts to identify the responsible aggregates by applying a clustering algorithm. If
this algorithm fails to ﬁnd a well-deﬁned aggregate, no action is taken. Once an aggregate isChapter 2 2.1. RESEARCH COMMUNITY
identiﬁed, its rate is limited so that the combination of its new rate with the rates of all other
(well-behaving) ﬂows arriving at the router does not exceed a certain conﬁgured value. The
congested router will then send a pushback message asking the immediate upstream routers
that send the bulk of the trafﬁc for an aggregate to rate-limit it; routers receiving this message
can then recursively propagate it upstream. These pushback messages are then sent periodically
as long as the attack persists. The downstream router now encounters the problem of deciding
whentostoptherequestforpushback, sinceitcannottellwhetherthehigh-bandwidthaggregate
has stopped because of the upstream ﬁltering or because the attack has ceased. To resolve this,
the upstream routers send out feedback messages reporting how much trafﬁc from an aggregate
they are still seeing.
Another approach relies on server-centric router throttles [64]. An overloaded server
installs appropriate throttling rates at distributed routing points such that, globally, server S
exports its full capacity to the network, but no more. S wants to keep its load between two
thresholds. If the load is too high S will increase the throttles and if the load is too low it will
decrease them. The set of internal routers is denoted by R, and each keeps only a few bytes
per victim: the victim’s IP address and the throttle value. While this increases linearly with
the number of victims, this should not present a scalability problem as DDoS attacks are the
exception rather than the norm. The throttles are installed at a subset R(k) of the R internal
routers, where k is the number of hops between a router and the server S, essentially forming
a perimeter around S. Throttles are also installed at routers that are less than k hops away but
directly connected to S. When S’s load surpasses the upper threshold, S advertises a throttle
increase to R(k), and each router in this set multiplies the current rate by a certain factor. Con-
versely, when S’s load falls below the lower threshold, S advertises a throttle decrease to R(k),
and each router in the set adds a factor to the current rate. This multiplicative decrease/additive
increase mimics TCP’s congestion control mechanism.
In D-WARD [39], routers at edge networks actively monitor TCP, ICMP and UDP ﬂows
and perform periodic comparison with normal ﬂow models. The attack response is essentially
a modiﬁcation of TCP’s congestion control mechanism. The system will apply fast exponential
decrease to the rate limit of non-responsive ﬂows; it will enforce slow recovery of rate-limited
ﬂows for a certain period; and it will allow fast recovery once a ﬂow has proved that it is well-
behaved.
Argyraki et al. [7] base their approach on the observation that while the resources of a
victim’s router are limited, the Internet routers have enough combined ﬁltering capability to
stop even very large DDoS attacks. Active Internet Trafﬁc Filtering (AITF) assumes that an end
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host can identify when it is being attacked and can single out, with high probability, a border
router close to the source of the attack trafﬁc. The victim contacts its AITF-enabled gateway
which installs a temporary ﬁlter on its behalf. The victim’s gateway then contacts the attacker’s
gateway and asks it to ﬁlter the malicious ﬂow. The attacker’s gateway in turn asks the attacker
to cease the ﬂow or risk being disconnected. Should this gateway refuse to collaborate with
the victim’s gateway (perhaps because it does not have AITF deployed), the latter will either
try to ﬁnd an AITF-enabled gateway on the same path but closer to itself or decide to ﬁlter
out the trafﬁc itself. The mechanism resorts to this second option in the worst case when no
AITF-enabled gateways exist.
Firebreak [21] forces packets to a protected host to travel through special routers called
ﬁrebreaksthataredeployednearsourcesoftrafﬁc; theseﬁrebreaksthentunnelthepacketstothe
protected host. To deal with incremental deployment, all ﬁrebreaks advertise the complete set
of ﬁrebreak addresses into the routing fabric using IP anycast. As a result, packets addressed to
any ﬁrebreak address are routed to a nearby ﬁrebreak. A similar approach is dFence [36], which
transparently inserts special middleboxes on the path of trafﬁc destined to hosts experiencing
DDoS.
Despite their merits, these solutions have their shortcomings. Pushback, for instance, re-
quires a path of deployed routers between a victim and the sources of the attack, an unlikely
scenario during initial deployment. Further, the routers determine that a ﬂow causing conges-
tion is malicious, which may not be the case. The approach of server-centric router throttles
suffers from a similar initial deployment issue, in that it assumes the availability of a perime-
ter of deployed routers. D-WARD has the advantage of placing control routers near potential
sources of attack, but it is not clear what incentive a source ISP would have to deploy such a
mechanism, nor is it trivial to determine whether a ﬂow is behaving or not, specially for large,
distributed attacks. AITF relies on middle-of-the-network routers (at least during initial deploy-
ment) to perform the actual ﬁltering, and depends upon a variant of IP route record to determine
where packets came from; as such, it faces severe deployment issues. Firebreak suffers from
several shortcomings. First, the ﬁrebreaks use IP anycast to advertise all of the addresses of
protected targets. Not only is large-scale IP anycast not well understood nor widely deployed,
but advertising in this fashion is likely to present scaling problems. Second, the paper points
out that, thanks to IP anycast, trafﬁc from clients whose ISPs do not have ﬁrebreaks will be
redirected to an ISP who does have ﬁrebreaks. However, it is quite unclear what incentive this
latter ISP has for accepting this trafﬁc nor why it should deploy a ﬁrebreak in the ﬁrst place if
there is the possibility of having to deal with another ISP’s trafﬁc. Finally, the scheme suggests
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stopping trafﬁc from clients connected to legacy routers from going directly to the target (with-
out ﬁrst traversing a ﬁrebreak) by only advertising the route to deployed ISPs. While this will
indeed prevent a legacy router from forwarding packets to a protected target, it assumes that
there will be no legacy ISP in the path between deployed ISPs and the target ISP. If there were,
the route would not be advertised to the legacy ISP and any deployed ISP behind it would be
oblivious to the fact that a route exists. This presents a signiﬁcant problem, especially during
initial deployment. The ﬁnal approach, dFence, requires a signiﬁcant amount of state to be kept
at the middle boxes in order to track connections, opening itself up to state attacks. Further, the
scheme does not give deployment incentives to early adopters.
2.1.2 Service Differentiation and Capabilities
A characteristic of hosts on the Internet is that they do not decide which packets to receive.
Schemes in this section aim to empower the receiver so that it will be in charge of deciding who
is allowed to send it packets. In general, a client requests permission to send packets, and, if the
server is not overloaded and decides that the client is legitimate, the server will respond with
a capability token. The client then includes this token in all its subsequent packets and routers
along the path to the server verify the validity of the token.
In the Stateless Internet Flow Filter (SIFF) approach [62], the process begins by dividing
Internet trafﬁc into privileged and unprivileged, where the former is always given priority over
the latter. To set up a privileged channel a client begins by sending an unprivileged explorer
(EXP) packet. Each router along the path calculates a z-bit long marking from a keyed hash
function with four inputs: the IP addresses of the source and destination, that of the router’s
incoming interface and that of the previous hop’s outgoing interface. The router then left-shifts
all previous markings in the capability ﬁeld of the EXP packet and adds its own marking to
the least signiﬁcant bits. Upon receipt of this EXP packet the server has to set up its half of
the privileged channel, so it sends its own EXP packet back to the client, this time writing
the markings that the routers provided into the optional capability reply ﬁeld. Once this second
packetarrives, theclientcopiesthevalueofthereplyﬁeldintothecapabilityﬁeldofaprivileged
data packet, and begins sending data to the server. Each router on the path now veriﬁes that its
marking matches that of the low-order bits in the packet’s ﬁeld: if it does not, the packet is
dropped; if it does, the marking bits are moved to the right-end of the ﬁeld and the packet is
forwarded. A data packet will only arrive at the server if it passes the checks of all routers along
the path.
In [4], sources are required to obtain a token from the destination before being allowed
to send packets. Request-to-Send (RTS) servers distributed along the path between the source
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and destination aid sources in obtaining such tokens; these are coupled with Veriﬁcation Points
(VP) that enforce the capabilities speciﬁed by the tokens. A source contacts its local RTS server
which in turn propagates the request all the way to the destination’s RTS server, creating state
in all the RTS servers in between. The destination then sends the token back to the source in
a symmetric path with regards to the RTS chain, and the source includes the given token in all
subsequent packets. Finally, the VP ensures that the source respects the given capability.
In [32], legitimate trafﬁc is separated from attack trafﬁc and protected during an attack.
This process is done through cryptographic techniques, so that only the ﬁrst connection packet
will suffer a delay, while all the rest will be privileged. When a server is overloaded, each client
(malicious or otherwise) is given a quota for high-priority trafﬁc; when this quota is exceeded,
the user will be considered an attacker and it will be rate-limited by a perimeter of routers
forming a line of defense.
The approaches presented in this section face important deployment issues: they require
changes to both the end-hosts so that they will know to request permission to send and to the
network so that it will police trafﬁc travelling to a server. Further, these mechanisms do not
provide a complete solution, since it is still possible to DoS the capability request channel.
2.1.3 Overlays
Solutions in this category, as their name indicates, consist of deploying a set of special nodes
forming an overlay network protecting potential victims. More speciﬁcally, overlays aim to
distribute the points of access to victims among a set of outer nodes: all packets must pass
through one of these nodes before they are allowed into the overlay network. Should a particular
ﬂow misbehave, its corresponding access node can limit its rate or drop it. While any one of
these nodes can be singled out and attacked, legitimate users can continue receiving service by
connecting to another of these nodes.
In i3 [1–3], the authors argue that hosts would be much better placed to effectively respond
to overload if they had control over which packets were dropped. For instance, a host running
multiple services may give higher priority to some services than others. As a result, hosts, not
the network, should be given control to respond to packet ﬂoods and overload. The use of the
i3 overlay provides a method of identifying hosts without using IP addresses. Sources send
packets to a logical identiﬁer and receivers express interest in packets by inserting a trigger into
the network. Packets are then of the form (id;data) and triggers are of the form (id;addr),
where addr can be either an IP address or an identiﬁer. Triggers, then, relay packets either to
a ﬁnal destination or to other triggers. This added level of indirection allows a host to stop
receiving packets from a particular trigger by simply removing it.
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In Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [30], a target or destination forming part of a Chord-
based overlay [8] notiﬁes other nodes, called secret servlets, of its presence, and has a ﬁltering
router drop any trafﬁc that does not come from them. These secret servlets, in turn, compute,
using several hash functions with the destination’s IP address as input, the identity of other
overlay nodes called beacons. The servlets then let the beacons know of their existence. When
a client wants to send a message to the destination, it must ﬁrst be authenticated by a Secure
Overlay Access Point (SOAP). Upon success, the SOAP will securely forward the message to
a beacon, who will in turn pass it to the secret servlet, and from there through the ﬁltering
router ﬁnally arriving at the destination. The levels of indirection and the self-healing nature of
the Chord protocol make this architecture robust against any of its components failing or being
compromised.
In COSSACK [22], each egress point has a component called a watchdog that monitors its
own network and shares information with watchdog peers. Watchdogs have two main functions:
detecting the onset of an attack and informing other watchdogs of the attack signature over a
multicast channel. Watchdogs at attackers’ networks then perform attack-packet ﬁltering.
Centertrack [55] is an overlay that relies on using IP tunnels to re-route interesting packets
directly from edge routers to special tracking routers. In this way a tracking router can deter-
mine whether a packet is malicious or not, and, if it is, easily follow the tunnel back to the
ingress point that the packet took into the overlay.
While overlays have the important advantage of being deployable without affecting the
existing network infrastructure, they do not provide a full solution to the DoS problem since
they tend to operate above the network layer, assuming the presence of other mechanisms to
protect it. Centertrack does operate at the network layer, but uses a central tracking router or
small network of tracking routers, providing an obvious target for a DoS attack.
2.1.4 Source Routing
While source routing is not directly intended as a scheme against DoS attacks, its very nature
makes it valuable against them. The requirement that sources specify the path a packet should
follow to the destination, coupled with the fact that routers along the way verify the path’s
validity, guarantees that sources cannot spoof their addresses. The availability of the entire
path at the destination not only allows easy trace back of the source, but also enables effortless
installation of ﬁlters close to the attacker.
In NIRA [63], users specify the inter-domain path that a packet should follow, empowering
them to select more optimal routes to destinations while fostering competition among ISPs.
Another beneﬁt of this architecture is that it forces sources to specify paths to destination that
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routers along the way can verify. As a result, source addresses cannot be spoofed, and malicious
ﬂows can be easily tracked back to their sources. The general process begins with each host
knowing its route to the core of the Internet. When a source S wishes to send to a destination
D, it requests that D send it its topology information (D’s route to the core). Upon receiving
this, S will combine its route to the core with D’s route to the core to form a complete path from
source to destination.
The Wide-Area Relay Protocol (WRAP) [6] is a proposed new protocol running over IP
and is a modiﬁed version of IP’s Loose Source and Record Route (LSRR). WRAP involves
the use of four header ﬁelds, two in the IP header and two in the WRAP header. IP’s source
address header is modiﬁed to always contain the IP address of the source-host or last relay (a
WRAP-enabled router) that has forwarded the packet. Likewise, IP’s destination header has the
IP address of the destination-host or the next relay. WRAP’s reverse path (RP) ﬁeld contains a
list of IP addresses of relays already traversed while its forward path has a list of IP addresses
of relays yet to be traversed. End-hosts (or the edge-system) are in charge of computing and
monitoring multiple paths to each potential destination in order to include a valid path in the FP
ﬁeld of the WRAP header. Relays then forward the packet according to the given path, as long
as it is valid and ISPs along the path have agreements to carry the trafﬁc. With this mechanism
in place an end-host can mitigate a DDoS attacks by identifying the paths whose ﬂows are
malicious. If the attack is too large, however, the end-host or network will quickly become
overwhelmed and will not be able to ﬁlter all of the malicious trafﬁc. The authors suggest using
a solution such as AITF to propagate ﬁltering requests to upstream routers who can drop these
packets closer to their sources.
The clear advantage of source routing in combating DoS attacks is that it provides an
enabling mechanism for easy deployment of ﬁlters near the attack’s source as well as easy trace
back to the source, rendering packet marking schemes unnecessary. However, source routing
requires wide deployment among routers in order to function. Further, NIRA introduces a new
addressing scheme that would require signiﬁcant changes not only to routers and providers but
also to end-hosts. If the numbers of addresses per host is high, NIRA may also prove prohibitive
to resource-limited devices. While WRAP indicates that no changes to hosts are needed if a
“translating” function is added to edge routers, this scheme also demands changes in routers as
well as signiﬁcant packet remarking upon forwarding.
2.1.5 Proof-of-Work
Denial-of-Service attacks are possible because sources are allowed to send packets even if des-
tinations do not want to receive them. Proof-of-work schemes rely on the destination or server
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issuing a computationally-intensive puzzle to its clients; it will then only accept packets from
those clients that provide the correct answer to the puzzle. Since, in general, attackers send
packets at a much higher rate than legitimate users, they will incur serious computational penal-
ties while legitimate users remain largely unaffected.
To provide coverage across all applications and protocols, client puzzles must be placed
at the layer that is common to all of them: the network layer. Feng et al. [19] introduce a new
protocol that relies on ICMP source quench messages to issue puzzles and on IP options to
reply with solutions. The authors consider four different types of puzzles to use in the protocol.
Time-lock puzzles require clients to perform repeated squaring operations. While they provide
an exact and ﬁxed amount of computational work, it is expensive for the server to generate
them. Hash-reversal puzzles forces clients to reverse a one-way hash given the original random
input with n bits erased. The disadvantage of this approach is that the granularity of the puzzles’
difﬁculty is coarse: an n bit puzzle is twice as hard as an n-1 bit puzzle. Multiple hash-reversal
puzzles improve this granularity, but issuing an increasing number of puzzles to achieve this
becomes prohibitive. Finally, hint-based hash-reversal puzzles provide the result of the hash
along with a hint whose accuracy can be varied to regulate the puzzle’s difﬁculty. It is this last
type that is used in the implementation of the protocol.
Felten et al. [18] introduce a new method of outsourcing puzzles utilizing a distributed
entity called a bastion that can be shared among several servers. Because of its distributed na-
ture and its good scalability, the outsourcing mechanism is robust against DoS attacks. The
authors present three methods for puzzle construction, time-lock, hash-reversal and “D-H”
(Difﬁe-Hellman), focusing on this last one since it allows client to solve puzzles off-line. The
current implementation is directed at TCP and it is left as future work to see if the techniques
are efﬁcient enough to work for lower-layer protocols such as IP.
In [47] clients are allowed to bid for service by computing puzzles with difﬁculty levels of
their own choosing. The server under attack allocates its limited resources to requests carrying
the highest priorities. Like the previous approach, this paper describes a TCP implementation,
and leaves the possibility of a network-layer implementation as future work.
All of these solutions aim to diminish the imbalance between a server’s resources and the
combined resources of its clients. The fact that servers can generate and verify puzzles very
efﬁciently while clients need to perform expensive calculations shifts some of the control over
to the server. These schemes, however, suffer from several problems. First, if an attack is
sufﬁciently distributed, each source of malicious packets (typically a zombie) will only have to
spend a relatively insigniﬁcant amount of time solving the puzzle. Worse still, when zombies
12Chapter 2 2.1. RESEARCH COMMUNITY
calculate solutions to puzzles on behalf of the attacker, it is the legitimate but unwitting owner
of the system that incurs the performance degradation resulting from these. Further, puzzles do
not take into account the possibility that several orders of magnitude in computing power may
exist among a server’s clients.
2.1.6 Anti-spooﬁng
As their name suggests, these schemes have the ultimate aim of distinguishing between genuine
packets and those whose source address does not reﬂect where they actually originated. While
they do not solve the DoS problem, they simplify the problem by allowing a victim to know
where the attack is coming from. Anti-spooﬁng solutions are quite varied, differing even in
where the ﬁltering takes place; the following is a sample of some of these approaches.
Hop-count ﬁltering [27] makes the observation that most spoofed IP packets do not carry
hop-count values that are consistent with the IP address being spoofed. To determine whether
or not a packet is spoofed, the hop-count is ﬁrst computed. The system keeps a table containing
a mapping of IP addresses to hop-counts, and if the hop-count of the incoming packet does not
match the value found in the table for the IP address of the packet, then the packet is deemed
spoofed. To populate this table initially, a node (presumably a server) collects traces of its
clients that contain both IP addresses and the corresponding Time-to-Live (TTL) values. The
hop-count value cannot be directly obtained from the IP header since no ﬁeld in it contains
this information. It can, however, be inferred from the TTL ﬁeld: the hop-count is equal to the
difference between the initial TTL value at the source and the ﬁnal TTL value at the destination.
The determination of the initial TTL value is based around the observation that while operating
systems do not use a common value to initialize this ﬁeld, the values used by most of them are
only a few.
Another approach is called Route-Based Distributed Packet Filtering (DPF) [42] and it
relies on placing anti-spooﬁng routers in the middle of the network (or adding functionality
to existing routers). These routers must have knowledge of what IP address ranges are valid,
and so the actual implementation of DPF would require at least an augmentation to BGP or the
introduction of a new protocol that would disseminate source reachability information rather
than destination reachability information.
Mirkovic et al. propose the Source Address Validity Enforcement Protocol (SAVE) [33] in
which routers periodically exchange SAVE messages. These messages propagate valid source
address information from the source location to all destinations, allowing each router along the
way to build a table that associates each incoming interface of the router with a set of valid
source address blocks. An incoming packet whose incoming interface and source IP address do
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not match any of the table entries of a router is dropped.
A more recent approach called Passport [34] relies on efﬁcient, symmetric-key cryptogra-
phytoallowautonomoussystems(AS)alongapacket’spathtoindependentlyverifyitsidentity.
The ASes obtain these keys through a Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange included in routing mes-
sages. In addition, the task of inserting the tokens used as packet identiﬁers can be off-loaded,
so there is no need to modify hosts.
Approaches in the network, such as DPF and SAVE, have the advantage of stopping
spoofed trafﬁc near the source or before it has had a chance to aggregate, at the cost of difﬁculty
of deployment. DPF requires that the underlying inter-domain routing protocol disseminates
source reachability information. As a result, it faces the signiﬁcant hurdle of either augmenting
BGP or creating a separate routing protocol. Neither one of these suggestions seems feasible
on the Internet. Further, a DPF node’s ability to ﬁlter trafﬁc may be hindered by the existence
of multiple paths to a source. Also, one would have to evaluate whether the added overhead
in keeping source reachability information in addition to destination information is justiﬁed by
the beneﬁts arising from doing so. Destination-based solutions such as Hop-Count Filtering are
easily deployed since the victim has an obvious interest in doing so; unfortunately, the attacker
could easily change the hop-count value of malicious packets, throwing off the mechanism. The
cryptographic approach of Passport shows promise, though it remains to be seen whether it will
see wide deployment.
2.1.7 Packet Marking
While not DoS solutions in themselves, schemes in this section aim to simplify the problem by
providing a mechanism that allows a victim to determine where the malicious trafﬁc came from.
To achieve this, routers in the network inform the destination about the paths that packets follow
beforearriving; alternatively, routerscankeepinformationaboutthepacketstheyforward. Even
if the attacker uses source address spooﬁng, with these mechanisms in place the victim can
determine which ﬂows are malicious and either ﬁlter them locally or trace them back towards
their sources to ﬁlter them farther upstream.
In IP Traceback [49], as a packet travels from the source to its destination, each router
along the path probabilistically marks it with partial path information. Since attacks are gener-
ally comprised of a large number of packets, this method ensures that, given enough packets, the
victim will eventually receive a marking from each of the routers, allowing it to reconstruct the
path from it to the attacker. Another approach similar to IP Traceback is proposed by Bellovin
et al. [11] and is called ICMP Traceback. As packets ﬂow through a router it generates, with
low probability, an ICMP message to the destination containing the router’s IP address. If a
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ﬂow has enough packets, as is the case during an attack, the victim will receive an ICMP packet
from each of the routers along the path and it will be able to trace the attack back to its sources.
A slightly different approach is called Hash-based IP Traceback [54]. This system allows
tracing a single packet back to its origin, relying on the deployment near routers of compo-
nents called Data Generation Agents (DGAs) that record information about packets as they are
forwarded. Clearly storing complete packets at the DGAs would present an insurmountable
storage capacity problem, so this scheme has DGAs use Bloom ﬁlters to reduce the amount
of space needed to store each packet, with the added beneﬁt of maintaining the privacy of the
packet’s contents.
Another scheme called Pi [61] deterministically marks packets so that those that follow the
same path will share a Path Identiﬁer. The packet marking is formed piecemeal by the routers
on the path from the attacker to the victim, overloading the 16-bit IP Identiﬁcation ﬁeld to do so.
While this means that the path identiﬁer may not be globally unique, this is not a requirement
to providing DDoS protection. Once the markings are in place, ﬁltering can be deployed at the
victim or preferably a dedicated machine like a ﬁrewall placed on the attack path to the victim.
It can be simple, dropping all packets with a certain path identiﬁed, or more complex, based on
conﬁgurable thresholds.
The main advantage of packet marking schemes is that they allow victims to trace packets
back to their origin even in the presence of source address spooﬁng. In addition, this informa-
tion can be derived post-mortem, after the attack has subsided (in the case of the hash-based
approach, the victim would have to query the DGA relatively soon after the router forwarded
the packet). However, packet marking has two serious obstacles. First, it requires signiﬁcant
deployment in order for the victim to receive markings from all (or most) of the routers along
a packet’s path. Even Pi, with its less stringent requirements, needs around 50% deployment
to guarantee deterministic markings. While the schemes can be implemented using existing
equipment, there is little incentive for deployment: the farther upstream a router is from the
victim, the less it will be affected by an attack, since distributed attack trafﬁc aggregates at the
victim and far away routers are unlikely to be seriously affected by it. Second, packet marking,
specially the probabilistic kind, depends upon a large number of packets ﬂowing through a path,
an assumption that does not always hold for distributed attacks. The hash-based approach does
not have this problem; however, despite the use of efﬁcient Bloom ﬁlters, it will eventually en-
counter storage space limitations since network bandwidth increases faster than memory access
speeds.
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2.1.8 Others
In PRIMED [58], ﬁlters are placed close to hosts and trained so that malicious trafﬁc is dropped
or given lower priority than legitimate trafﬁc. However, it assumes that most IP packets are not
spoofed; while this may be true in the current Internet, deploying a mechanism like PRIMED
would result in attackers quickly resorting to spooﬁng. Even without this problem, it is not
clear how accurate the ﬁlters will be, nor does the study present testbed ﬁgures to show the
performance of the system under stress.
In a rather radical approach [60], the authors state that a characteristic of DoS attacks is
that a small number of bad clients can deny service to a far larger number of legitimate clients.
Further, they observe that in many cases bad clients are bandwidth-limited, otherwise they
would simply send at higher rates to increase the attack’s effectiveness. The solution consists
of a server under attack asking legitimate clients to send at a higher rate, so that the percentage
of the link used up by malicious trafﬁc is decreased. Despite its merits, operators will likely be
reluctant to deploy a DoS protection scheme that increases trafﬁc during an attack.
2.2 Commercial Solutions
Commercial DoS solutions exist from companies like Cisco [14], Arbor [5] and Mazu [37].
However, these do not inter-operate and are meant to provide point or site protection against
DoS attacks, not scale to architectural levels. In addition, if an attack is large enough it can
still bring down a site protected by this type of hardware. Finally, these boxes are expensive,
and a large number of ISPs and server owners cannot afford them. An alternative are scrubbing
centers [46], in which trafﬁc is sanitized before reaching a victim. While effective against some
of the attacks currently taking place, it is not clear whether they would be able to withstand a
massive attack. Further, neither this protection nor the others mentioned in this section come
cheaply, and so are not affordable to all victims of DDoS attack.
2.3 Conclusions
While many of the research solutions discussed above show promise, they tend to place new
requirements on the network or end clients, resulting in difﬁcult initial deployment issues.
From the more radical source routing approaches to packet marking and capabilities schemes,
a requirement is placed to implement signiﬁcant changes on the network and sometimes even
the end-hosts, rendering these solutions impractical in the current Internet. While overlays do
present a more feasible deployment story, they do not provide a full solution to the DoS problem
since they tend to operate above the network layer.
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Another common problem among research solutions is deployment incentives. Often these
are completely overlooked or are misaligned: those parties that must deploy in order for the
schemes to work are the ones that see the least beneﬁt from initial deployment. Consequently,
the approaches, while technically sound, have little chance of seeing the light of the day on the
Internet.
Commercialsolutionsdonotprovideaperfectsolutioneither. Theserelyonbuyingspecial
boxes or redirecting trafﬁc through scrubbing centers, both expensive options that only larger
sites can afford. In addition, it is possible for a very large attack to bring even these defenses
down, since the boxes’ lack of inter-operability means that their defense cannot be made to
scale to architectural levels.
Despite promising work both in the research and commercial ﬁelds, there is still no com-
prehensive, architecturalsolutiontotheproblemoflarge, distributedDoSattacks. Whileseveral
proposals have been put forth, they all suffer from initial deployment and incentives issues. The
next chapter presents a series of architectural solutions to the DoS problem that aim to address
these issues while requiring only off-the-shelf hardware to be implemented.
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Architectures
The goal is to design and implement an architecture to combat large, distributed Denial-of-
Service attacks. In addition, the architecture has to be incrementally deployable and provide
clear incentives for early adopters or it will never see the light of day. Indeed, many of the
solutions presented in the related work solve the DoS problem to various degrees, but they fail
to do so in an incrementally deployable manner, and, as a result, the DoS problem continues to
grow. Further, the solution needs to take spooﬁng into account or it may be turned into a DoS
tool in its own right. While currently most attacks do not spoof, this is certain to change if an
anti-DoS mechanism is put in place.
The proposed contribution consists of three architectures against DoS and their evaluation.
The architectures are incrementally deployable, providing incentives for early adopters while
improving in effectiveness as deployment continues. Each of the components of the architec-
tures will be built on different types of cheap, off-the-shelf-hardware and their performance
evaluated on a network testbed to see how they cope when dealing with a load similar to the
one they would experience while enduring a large attack. The testing will also aim to under-
stand which extreme conditions would make a particular component fail. The ultimate goal
and contribution will be to give conﬁdence that the architectures presented would be effective
against large DoS attacks on the Internet.
The work in the ﬁrst architecture stemmed from a paper by Handley and Greenhalgh [24]
describing seven steps that could be taken to protect the Internet against DoS attacks. The pa-
per’s approach was purposely radical, ignoring deployment issues. The aim of the architecture
described in section 3.1 is, consequently, to retain as many of the advantages described in the
paper while keeping deployability in mind. The second architecture (section 3.2) makes sig-
niﬁcant changes to the ﬁrst one, resulting in important improvements in terms of deployability
and making it more likely to be able to implement it using off-the-shelf hardware. The ﬁnal
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previous ones, making it easier to deploy on the Internet.
3.1 Routing and Tunneling Architecture
Ideally we would like to protect all Internet hosts, but realistically it is usually servers that
present the biggest target. We propose, consequently, to provide a protected virtual net for
those servers that wish to be better defended. An ISP providing such protection could charge a
premium fee for the service, giving a clear incentive for deployment. In [55] the author presents
a similar approach to the trace back problem that works for small DDoS attacks in the context
of a single ISP. Our solution is intended to extend to a network of many collaborating ISPs, but
in this section we ﬁrst examine how our solution might initially be deployed at a single ISP,
before examining how multiple ISPs might cooperate.
3.1.1 Single ISP Architecture
The ﬁrst step is to designate certain subnets of the IP address space as server subnets: these will
receive additional protection from attack. We refer to these subnets collectively as the server-
net; conceptually they are within a protection boundary ringed by control points. Trafﬁc from
the public Internet must traverse one of these control points on its way into the server-net.
A condition of being a server-net host is not being permitted to send directly to other
server-net hosts. This constraint prevents hosts inside the server-net from attacking other hosts
inside the server-net, and prevents server-net hosts being exploited as relays in reﬂection at-
tacks on other server-net hosts1. It also helps slow the spread of worms within the server-net
boundary.
The basic functions of a server-net boundary control point are encapsulation and ﬁlter-
ing. At an encapsulator, packets destined for a server are encapsulated IP-in-IP, and sent to
a decapsulator located in the server’s co-location facility. An ISP must have at least one en-
capsulator, but maximum beneﬁt will be gained with one encapsulator associated with each
Point-of-Presence (PoP) or peering link.
The principal advantage of this architecture is that when a server is attacked, the decap-
sulator knows precisely which encapsulators the malicious trafﬁc traversed. As a result, it can
ask them to ﬁlter trafﬁc, stopping the attack some distance upstream of the victim. We note that
encapsulation is not the only technique by which this could be achieved. In particular, MPLS
tunneling might also be used for this purpose. However IP-in-IP encapsulation has advantages
over MPLS. First, the address of the encapsulator can be directly obtained by the decapsulator,
1This applies to hosts sending to hosts in other subnets or to server-nets in other domains. It would be harder to
prevent communication between hosts in the same subnet since they are directly connected.
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Figure 3.1: Scenarios for single ISP architecture.
rather than needing additional mechanisms to reverse map the MPLS labels, but perhaps more
importantly it is much harder to extend an MPLS solution inter-domain, which is our eventual
goal.
Causing incoming trafﬁc, even trafﬁc originating from within the local ISP, to traverse an
encapsulator requires careful control of routing. Routes to the server-net subnets should only
be advertised from the encapsulators themselves, to ensure that there is no way to bypass them
and send directly to the servers. In addition, the decapsulator addresses should be taken from
the ISP’s infrastructure address space, which (according to best current practice) should never
be advertised outside of the ISP’s own network. This prevents an attacker directly ﬂooding a
decapsulator associated with a server.
Possible communication paths within this architecture are illustrated in Figure 3.1. Flows
1 and 2 show the typical scenario with packets from a client passing through an encapsulator,
being sent to a decapsulator, and ﬁnally arriving at the servers. Flow 3 is client to client and
is unaffected. Flow 4, from one protected server to another, is disallowed to prevent reﬂection
attacks and the spread of worms. Finally, ﬂow 5 shows a protected server choosing to perform
decapsulation itself.
Server!client trafﬁc could be sent via the reverse of the incoming tunnel, or it could be
forwarded natively. Either reverse path for the trafﬁc is feasible with the proposed architecture,
it should be an operational decision as to which is used. Tunneling has the beneﬁt that a smart
encapsulator can view both directions of a ﬂow, allowing it to monitor and ﬁlter trafﬁc more
intelligently. However, this requires forwarding state at the decapsulator that is set up based on
observed incoming trafﬁc, and this state might be vulnerable to DoS if source address spooﬁng
is used.
Onesolutionisfortheservertoswitchdynamicallyfromanativetoatunneledreversepath
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once a connection is fully established and is therefore known not to be spoofed. Trafﬁc with
a tunneled reverse path can then be forwarded from encapsulator to decapsulator with higher
diffserv priority, which might lessen the effect of ﬂooding attacks that spoof source addresses.
The goal of a server-net when deployed at a single ISP is to allow automated ﬁltering of
unwanted trafﬁc at the ingress point of that ISP. To perform such automated ﬁltering requires
a detection infrastructure in place, located so that it can monitor trafﬁc to the server. Possible
locations for this would be in the decapsulator, in the server, or on the path between the two.
Once a ﬂow has been identiﬁed as hostile, the decapsulator needs to be informed, and it
in turn informs the encapsulator, which installs the appropriate ﬁlter. The use of infrastructure
addresses between decapsulator and encapsulator is the ﬁrst line of defense against subversion
of the ﬁltering capabilities, as it should simply not be possible for normal Internet hosts to send
ﬁltering requests directly to an encapsulator. Behind this ﬁrst line of defense, the signalling
channel between the decapsulator and the encapsulator should be secured. Simple nonce ex-
change may be sufﬁcient to protect against off-path attacks, given that a compromised router on
the path can already cause DoS. Public-key-based solutions are, of course, also possible.
The beneﬁts are clearly greatest for large ISPs hosting server farms and running a large
number of encapsulators. Such ISPs will typically have many peering points with other large
ISPs, and these peering points will be both geographically and topologically distributed. Thus
trafﬁc from a large distributed attack will be spread across many encapsulators because it will
be entering the network from many neighboring ISPs, and so it will be stopped closer to its
origin, before it has aggregated to the point where it can cause serious damage.
Smaller ISPs still beneﬁt because their customers can control their degree of exposure, but
a large enough attack is likely to overwhelm all incoming links. Nothing an ISP can do by itself
will help in such circumstances.
3.1.2 Inter-ISP Communication
The beneﬁts of a server-net increase as ISPs co-operate. Extending the protection boundary of
the server-net to include the server-nets of co-operating ISPs moves the control points nearer
to the sources of the DoS trafﬁc. As we extend the protection boundary, distributed attacks
become less concentrated at any particular control point, since trafﬁc from each attacking host
enters the server-net through its local encapsulator. Trafﬁc that would previously have traversed
the peering link uncontrolled now traverses the peering link encapsulated, within the server-net
control boundary.
The general idea is that trafﬁc enters the server-net at the server-net ISP closest to the
trafﬁc source, and is then tunneled from that ISP’s encapsulator directly to a decapsulator at the
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Figure 3.2: Route propagation for single ISP server-net
destination ISP border. At the destination ISP, the trafﬁc is decapsulated and re-encapsulated
to get it to the ﬁnal decapsulator near to the server. In principle it would be possible to tunnel
direct from the remote ISP to the server subnet, but this assumes a degree of trust between ISPs
that seems unlikely and unnecessary.
Trafﬁc originating within an immediate neighbor ISP is forwarded natively to the border
of the destination ISP where it is encapsulated as in the single ISP case.
3.1.3 Single ISP Routing
The basic requirements of routing to implement a server-net within a single ISP are:
 Server-net addresses must only be advertised to the rest of the Internet from the encapsu-
lators. [operational requirement]
 The encapsulators need to learn which subnets are in the server-net space, and which
decapsulator is associated with each. [operational requirement]
 The addresses used by the encapsulator and decapsulator must not be advertised to the
outside world. [security requirement]
 A server-net subnet must not be advertised to server-net hosts on other server-net subnets.
[security requirement]
We believe these requirements can be satisﬁed by current BGP[48] implementations on current
router hardware.
The server-net could be manually conﬁgured, but in a large ISP this will probably be
unfeasible. There are many ways to do this dynamically, but one possible solution is illustrated
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in Figure 3.2 and elaborated below.
(i) The decapsulator associated with a server-net subnet advertises that subnet into I-BGP2.
It advertises its decapsulation address as the BGP next-hop router address. The route
is tagged with a special BGP server-net community3. The route is also tagged with the
“do not export” community that the ISP normally uses to indicate internal infrastructure
routes that should not be exported to peers.
(ii) All border routers in the domain are already conﬁgured to not propagate routes to their
external peers that have been tagged with the do not export community, so server-net
routes will not leak to the outside world.
(iii) All encapsulators in the domain receive the server-net routes, and match on the server-net
community. They then remove the do not export community and the server-net com-
munity from matching routes, and re-advertise them to external peers with the next-hop
rewritten to be their own address. This will draw external trafﬁc to the encapsulators.
(iv) The encapsulators also re-advertise any routes tagged with the server-net community into
their IGP routing4. IGP routes are generally preferred over I-BGP routes on the basis of
administrative distance[15], so this will cause trafﬁc from clients within the ISP’s domain
to be drawn to the encapsulators rather than directly to the decapsulators.
(v) The decapsulator routers also receive routes containing the server-net community that
have been advertised by other decapsulators. The decapsulator installs a black-hole route
for these subnets to prevent server-net to server-net communication.
Using routing in this way should satisfy our requirements. It is likely that slightly simpler
solutions are possible if we can add BGP Path Attributes, but this is probably best done in the
light of deployment experience.
3.1.4 Multiple ISP Routing
To protect its own server subnets, each ISP joining a multi-ISP server-net ﬁrst runs the mecha-
nisms described for a single-ISP server-net. To peer within a multi-ISP server-net, the following
changes are needed:
2I-BGP: Internal BGP - using BGP to carry routing information between routers within a domain.
3A community is a locally deﬁned BGP routing tag. The actual value of community to use can be locally decided
by the ISP.
4IGP: Interior Gateway Protocol - the intra-domain routing within an ISP, typically OSPF or IS-IS.
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Figure 3.3: Route propagation for multi-ISP server-net
(i) Instead of an encapsulator at the border of the ISP, as shown in ﬁgure 3.2, a router with
both encapsulation and decapsulation capability is used.
(ii) The encap/decap router does not remove the server-net and do not export communities
when transmitting the route to a cooperating neighboring ISP5.
If the number of server subnets in the multi-ISP server-net were small, then the neighboring
ISP can do exactly as described in the single ISP solution. However, in a large server-net, the
number of server subnets is likely to exceed the number of routes that can be safely redistributed
into the IGP. In addition, even cooperating ISPs are likely to be wary of providing another ISP
with a way to inject routes into their IGP. Thus we need to modify the mechanism a little, as
shown in ﬁgure 3.3.
On receipt at the neighboring ISP, the border router will match on the server-net commu-
nity, and add an additional server-net-transit community to these routes, distinguishing them
from locally originated server-net routes. Routes with this additional community will not be
redistributed into the IGP routing by encapsulators.
The result is that trafﬁc from clients within the neighboring ISP’s network (C2 in Figure
3.3) will reach the ﬁrst encapsulator in the destination ISP using native forwarding. On the
other hand, trafﬁc from clients that would transit the neighboring ISP (C4 in Figure 3.3) will
be encapsulated by the neighboring ISP’s encapsulator and tunneled to the decapsulator at the
destination ISP, before being immediately re-encapsulated and sent on to the destination server
subnet’s decapsulator.
5This assumes that both ISPs use the same community values to indicate the server-net and do-not-export. If not,
it will have to translate to the neighboring ISPs values.
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Where more than two ISPs peer within a server-net, routes distributed onward to other
server-net ISPs are sent with the BGP next-hop unchanged. Thus trafﬁc will only ever be
encapsulated and decapsulated twice:
 Encapsulated at the ﬁrst encapsulator in the nearest server-net domain to the client.
 Decapsulated and immediately re-encapsulated at the ﬁrst encapsulator in the destination
ISP.
 Decapsulated at the destination subnet.
There is one issue remaining with regards to ﬁgure 3.3. There is no guarantee that trafﬁc
from clients C3 will traverse encapsulator E2 on its way to R1, and hence be encapsulated. To
ensure this does happen requires controlling the inter-domain distribution of routes for R1. In
fact the requirement is that routes for such decapsulators only transit between ISPs at the same
peerings that server-net routes transit. A very similar use of an additional community tag can
be made to preserve this congruence. The principal difference is that such routes are never
propagated outside the server-net boundary.
3.1.5 Encapsulation and Filtering
IP-in-IP encapsulation is a standard feature on most routers. Juniper Networks ship a hardware
tunnel interface module[28] capable of encapsulation at 10Gb/s that supports 8,000 tunnel vir-
tual interfaces; other vendors no doubt have similar products. Thus current hardware is capable
of performing fast tunneling to enough destinations to satisfy even large server-nets.
Most backbone routers also support packet ﬁltering capability. It seems likely that they
support sufﬁcient ﬁlter rules to cope with attacks on the scales currently seen. In a multi-ISP
server-net, any one attack is spread across many encapsulators, making it even harder for an
attacker to saturate the ﬁltering capability.
No standard exists for automated pushback of ﬁlters, but one would likely emerge if server-
nets were widely deployed. In the meantime, a signalling channel would have to work around
what is currently available.
Bro[43] can enable ﬁlter rules via the command line interface of Cisco routers. This is
clunky, but works. In a similar manner, a server-net could use buddy-hosts co-located with each
encapsulator. A buddy host would validate that a ﬁlter request came from the correct server-net
decapsulator address by checking the BGP routing table, and then performing a handshake to
prevent spooﬁng. It would install the ﬁlter rule in its local encapsulator using the command line
interface. In the long run, we expect routers would directly support such a signalling channel.
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Figure 3.4: Encapsulation architecture.
The minimum ﬁlter granularity would likely be <src IP, dst prefix> to
prevent the targeting of other hosts on a victim’s subnet. Also possible is
<src prefix, dst prefix> to avoid an attacker spooﬁng multiple hosts on the same
source subnet.
3.2 Edge-to-Edge Filtering Architecture
This architecture allows hosts under attack to request that the network stop trafﬁc from speciﬁed
sources before it can aggregate signiﬁcantly. Similar to the previous approach, three basic
mechanisms are required: marking, so that the network can know where malicious packets
are coming from; ﬁltering, so that undesired packets are dropped; and routing, so that trafﬁc
travelling towards a destination is forced to traverse this ﬁltering.
In this section we introduce an edge-to-edge architecture that implements the three mech-
anisms mentioned earlier, but does so in a very different way from the previous architecture.
The most important change has to do with the location of the control points that mark and ﬁlter
packets: whereas previously they were placed at the edges of the ISP hosting the server being
defended, these are now deployed as close to the clients of the server as possible.
This change has signiﬁcant beneﬁts. First, it means that these control points never have to
handle large trafﬁc aggregates and so can be built and deployed inexpensively. Second, their
placement at the edges of the network makes it difﬁcult for an attacker to indirectly DoS a server
by attacking the encapsulator. Finally, no ﬁltering or marking is required from the middle of
the network, simplifying the deployment story.
The architecture presented in this section also improves over the previous one by distribut-
ing path-agnostic routes using a separate and extremely robust peer-to-peer protocol, relieving
any burden from BGP and removing any disaggregation issues. Finally, it has a simpler initial
deployment story, and provides better incentives for it.
But with these advantages come one major problem: it is now possible for some attackers
at legacy ISPs to spoof the encapsulation. A key contribution of this architecture is to show
that this is not a show-stopper: some additional mechanism is required to be robust, but the
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complexity is not excessive. What follows is an explanation of the full solution and these issues
in greater detail.
3.2.1 Marking and Filtering
As source IP addresses can be spoofed, if we want to shut down malicious trafﬁc close to its
source, a marking mechanism is needed so packets can be traced back to their origin. While
many solutions have been proposed for this, a simple mechanism already exists that is just right
for the job: IP-in-IP tunneling. The idea is simple: encapsulate all packets near their sources
and decapsulate them near their destinations, using the encapsulation header to record the origin
network. Two additional boxes are needed for this: an “encapsulator” near the source and a
“decapsulator” near the destination; these boxes will also collaborate to ﬁlter unwanted trafﬁc.
In a later chapter we will show that they can be implemented using off-the-shelf hardware.
During normal operation (see Figure 3.4), a packet from a client will reach a local encap-
sulator on the path to the Internet. The encapsulator looks up the IP address of the decapsulator,
IP-in-IP encapsulates it, and sends the packet to the decapsulator. The source address in the
encapsulation header serves to tell the decapsulator which encapsulator forwarded the packet.
At the decapsulator, the outer encapsulation header is removed, and the packet is forwarded on
to the server.
When a protected server comes under attack, it will send a request to its local decapsulator
to ﬁlter trafﬁc it deems unwanted6. On receipt of a ﬁltering request for a particular source, the
decapsulator will wait for the next packet from that source and note down which encapsulator
it came through. While this requires the decapsulator to keep state and monitor the trafﬁc going
through it, this state is only temporary and will last only until the ﬁltering request is sent.
Once the decapsulator ﬁgures out which encapsulator to talk to, it will send out the actual
ﬁltering request. Finally, the encapsulator will install the ﬁlter, blocking the unwanted trafﬁc.
In this way, the server under attack can ask the network to stop sending it undesired trafﬁc, an
impossibility in the current Internet.
Of course the full story is not quite as simple as sketched out above, and we will now look
at what would be required for this general idea to be viable.
3.2.2 Routing
To perform edge-to-edge encapsulation, the encapsulator needs to know how to map the desti-
nation IP address from a data packet to the address of the relevant decapsulator. Essentially this
is a routing problem, and this information could in principle be conveyed by BGP. However,
6The detection mechanism is beyond the scope of this architecture, but a commercial detection box may be able
to perform this role.
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Figure 3.5: Partial deployment scenarios.
using BGP would be far from ideal, as the routers in the core of the Internet do not need to know
this information. Indeed, the encapsulator does not care about the precise path, but only which
decapsulator to tunnel the packet to. Thus, we would be burdening BGP with a great deal of
additional information for no good reason. The mapping from network preﬁx to decapsulator
address or addresses is relatively static, so we suggest that a separate dissemination channel be
used to distribute these mappings.
As this information is not path-speciﬁc, any simple ﬂooding algorithm can be used for this
distribution, so long as the data itself is secured. Since no policy is involved, decapsulation
routes can be ﬂooded to all of an ISP’s neighbors, making this distribution much more robust
than conventional inter-domain routing. We will discuss possible routing designs in section
3.2.8.
Making an encapsulator check a large number of digital signatures on startup might be
problematic. In reality though, the number of signatures required is not related to the number
of decapsulators, but rather to the number of origin Autonomous Systems in the BGP routing
tables. Each AS can sign as a group all the preﬁx-to-decapsulator bindings for routes that it
advertised, reducing the number of signatures to around 20,000 or so in the current Internet.
In addition, there is no need for the edge encapsulators to directly check the signatures them-
selves. Instead a hierarchy within an ISP can be established, whereby one or more servers
receive the routes from neighboring ISPs, check the signatures and only then pass them on to
the encapsulators. Thus we believe that signed mappings from destination address preﬁxes to
decapsulator addresses are technically viable and economically feasible, even in the extreme
case of a different decapsulator for every /24 subnet in the Internet.
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3.2.3 Legacy ISPs
If the mechanism deployed above were ubiquitous, then source-address spooﬁng by end-
systems would be ineffective, and all unwanted ﬂooding attacks could be stopped close to their
sources. However, such a scheme must also work with partial deployment, which leaves open
the possibility of DoS attacks by end-systems at legacy ISPs that do not deploy encapsulators.
Toprotectagainstattacksfromsuchhosts, anISPprotectingaservercaninvolvetheborder
routers at its ingress points. One possible solution would be to deploy a diffserv classiﬁer that
prioritizes IP-in-IP trafﬁc destined for the local decapsulators, reducing the effectiveness of
bandwidth ﬂooding attacks that attempt to saturate links. Attacks using unencapsulated trafﬁc
will then have minimal effect on trafﬁc from networks deploying encapsulators.
Of course the astute attacker will then simply perform encapsulation directly from his at-
tacking end-systems, so that his trafﬁc is prioritized too. By spooﬁng the encapsulation header,
such an attacker at a legacy ISP can make his trafﬁc appear to be coming from many encapsula-
tors. One way to avoid spoofed encapsulation would be to restrict the distribution of routes for
the decapsulator addresses, so that the decapsulators are simply unreachable from legacy ISPs.
If all the ISPs deploying encapsulators formed a connected graph under normal BGP routing,
then this would effectively prevent such attacks from succeeding. However, it is unlikely that
such a graph would be connected, at least early in the deployment process, so this solution is
not ideal.
Another option would be for all ISPs deploying our scheme to also run an encapsulator for
all trafﬁc arriving from legacy neighbors; this is close to the solution described in the previous
section. However, performing such encapsulation and ﬁltering on high-speed peering links
would be more costly than performing it at edge-links since it could no longer be done with
off-the-shelf PCs; this would present an unnecessary deployment hurdle.
Instead, our preferred solution would be to use a single bit in the packets to indicate
that trafﬁc destined to a protected server has traversed a legacy ISP. Such a bit is inspired by
Bellovin’s “evil bit” [10]. ISPs deploying our scheme would install a simple ﬁlter at all border
routers connecting to legacy ISPs, setting the evil bit in packets arriving from these neighbors.
If, along the path, a packet traverses any ISP that does not perform encapsulation, then it is
classed as potentially evil. ISPs hosting servers can then choose to prioritize trafﬁc that has
come via a path where all the ISPs perform encapsulation.
Figure 3.5 illustrates this mechanism. ISPs A and G are legacy ISPs while the other ISPs
have deployed encapsulation. Routers C1, C2, D1, D2, and E1 are conventional border routers
conﬁgured with simple packet classiﬁers.
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A spoofed encapsulated packet from host H1 destined for the server will traverse ISP A
unchanged. Through contractual agreements ISP C will know whether ISP A is a legacy ISP or
not; since it is, when the packet reaches ISP C, Router C1 will set the packet’s “evil bit”, since
it knows that the packet came from a legacy neighbor. Router E1 later uses the evil bit to put
the packet in a lower priority diffserv class.
A similar packet from host H2 would reach E1 with its evil bit cleared, since ISPs B, C and
D have all deployed encapsulation; as a result, it is classiﬁed as higher priority. However, should
the server deem packets from this source to be malicious, it can request that the encapsulator
drop them. Even if the host is spooﬁng, this mechanism will be able to ﬁlter the trafﬁc as far as
the encapsulator, at which point the problem becomes a local one.
Finally, an encapsulated packet from host H3 would have its evil bit set by ISP D, since
although ISP F has deployed encapsulation, provider G has not. Thus all packets arriving at
router D2 get the evil bit set, and so receive lower priority at E1. While this may at ﬁrst seem
harsh, it provides the right incentive: customer ISP F will put pressure on ISP G to deploy the
scheme (or even switch upstream providers) so that their clients will not be placed in a lower
priority queue.
3.2.4 Preventing Abuse of Defenses
Providing a mechanism whereby the recipient of trafﬁc can request that trafﬁc cease is an ef-
fective way to defend against all but the most subtle ﬂooding attacks. However, care must be
taken to avoid an attacker using our mechanism to deny service to legitimate trafﬁc. We divide
the spectrum of possible attacks into two independent vectors:
 Direct attacks that send ﬁltering requests.
 Indirect attacks that generate spoofed trafﬁc with the aim of triggering the defense mech-
anism to take inappropriate action.
For both cases it is possible to exhaustively enumerate the options open to an attacker,
based on what a bot can spoof under differing circumstances and on where the bot is located
relative to the systems under attack. These are shown in ﬁgures 3.6 and 3.7.
For direct attacks the attacker’s options are fairly limited, and we only need to consider
spoofed decapsulators in various locations. For indirect attacks there are more cases to consider:
 A bot at a legacy ISP may be able to spoof the encapsulator header, or the client address
(so long as a full TCP connection is not needed for the attack) or both.
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Figure 3.6: Table of indirect attacks. The letter A stands for the attacker, C the client, E the encapsulator
and D the decapsulator.
Spoofed Request A on E $ D Path Comments
  No attack

p
A can drop request
p
 See ﬁgure 3.8:5
p p
A can drop request
Figure 3.7: Table of direct attacks.
 A bot at an encapsulating ISP may still be able to spoof the client address if ingress
ﬁltering is not performed.
 A bot may be located at the same ISP as the legitimate client he wishes to deny service
to, or at a different ISP.
For indirect attacks, spooﬁng the decapsulator provides no advantage, so we do not consider
this case.
We will now examine each of the indirect attack scenarios in Figure 3.6. The ﬁrst two
entries do not constitute an attack and are there merely for completeness.
The third entry (ﬁgure 3.8.1) consists of an attacker C located at a legacy ISP who spoofs
encapsulator E, but uses his own address C as the client address. The reason for doing this might
be that he needs a full TCP connection to trigger a response from the server’s defenses. As a
result of the spooﬁng, if the server determines the trafﬁc of C to be malicious, the decapsulator
D will ask E to install a ﬁlter. This attack is rather harmless unless the attacker possesses a very
large number of bots. In such cases it could represent a state-holding attack on E. However, so
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Figure 3.8: Potential abuse scenarios
long as E knows which subnets are legitimate client addresses, this attack will not succeed, as
E can simply decline to install the ﬁlters.
The fourth entry in the table represents an impossible situation, since the attacker would
not be able to spoof an encapsulator from a non-legacy ISP.
Intheﬁfthentry(ﬁgure3.8.2)attackerC’sitsbehindlegitimateencapsulatorE2andspoofs
trafﬁc from client C, which sits behind encapsulator E1. When D receives a request to block
trafﬁc “from C to S”, it will wait for the next packet from C to S to arrive and note which
encapsulator it came from. However, it is possible that this packet will come from the legitimate
C through E1, while the packets that caused the detection mechanism to request the ﬁlter may
have come through E2; if we asked E1 to install the ﬁlter, the attacker would succeed in denying
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service to C. In essence, D does not know whether to send the ﬁltering request to E1 or E2. The
simplest solution would be for E2 to block this spoofed trafﬁc, as C is not a customer address
for E2’s ISP. However, this is not always possible, so we would like our solution to work
even in the absence of ingress ﬁltering. If every ISP deploying an encapsulator also deploys
a decapsulator (a likely scenario) then, using the signed decapsulator routing tables, D would
contact C’s decapsulator requesting a list of C’s encapsulators. As E2 is not on this list, D
can safely request that E2 block all trafﬁc from C. The same effect could also be achieved by
disseminating the encapsulator list in the decapsulation routing table.
In the sixth entry in the table (ﬁgure 3.8.3), both C and C’ sit behind encapsulator E.
Clearly, neither D nor S can distinguish between trafﬁc from C and C’. S will request E to ﬁlter
trafﬁc from C (spoofed or not), so C’ is successful in denying service to C, although he cannot
deny service to other clients of S. In effect the problem has become one that is local to C’s ISP,
and there are a range of existing solutions available to tackle this, including enabling ingress
ﬁltering.
The seventh entry (ﬁgure 3.8.4) describes the most subtle attack to defend against. An
attacker C’ at a legacy ISP spoofs a trafﬁc ﬂood so that it seems to come from C, encapsulated
by E. In this way, it could cause S to request a ﬁlter at E that would block legitimate trafﬁc from
C. If the packets claiming to come from C arrived with the evil bit cleared, we would know that
the outer header is valid, a fact that can be propagated to S and the detection system it uses.
As a result, S could distinguish between packets arriving on the real path C ! E ! D and
the spoofed path C0 ! E0 ! D by observing the evil bit. S can now determine whether the
unspoofed trafﬁc via E is hostile (in which case it should request a ﬁlter) or only the trafﬁc
spooﬁng E is hostile (in which case it should take no action, and rely on prioritization to limit
the effects of the attack). What if the path C ! E ! D contained legacy ISPs, so that the
evil bit is set on all packets? In this case, trafﬁc from both paths would be indistinguishable.
To remedy this, upon receiving the ﬁltering request from S, D can provide E with a random
number to use to mark subsequent packets (the encapsulation header can contain this). Now
D can once again distinguish between the two paths, and all it needs do is to propagate this
distinction downstream to S. D can use a diffserv code point to do this, so S’s detector can
again take the right action to ensure that no legitimate trafﬁc from C is blocked.
The ﬁnal entry in ﬁgure 3.6 presents an impossible scenario, since the attacker cannot
spoof an encapsulator from a non-legacy ISP.
We will now proceed to discussing the direct attack cases described in ﬁgure 3.7. The ﬁrst
entry does not represent an attack. In the second and fourth entries the attacker sits on the path
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between the encapsulator and the decapsulator. These cases are hard to defend against, since
the attacker can blackhole legitimate ﬁltering requests. In the fourth case, unless requests are
required to be digitally signed by the decapsulator, the attacker can also spoof them to shut
down legitimate ﬂows. Such digital signatures should be a mechanism of last resort, reserved
only for the case where an on-path attacker is suspected, as they would greatly increase the
CPU load on both the encapsulator and decapsulator. However, the encapsulator does already
have the relevant key chain to validate such requests, as this is needed to validate preﬁx-to-
decapsulator bindings. In reality though, this is a case we are not greatly concerned about - on
path attackers should be rare (the normal bot infection techniques do not apply to routers) and
in any event a compromised on-path router has so many other ways to deny service, including
simply dropping the packets, that abuse of our mechanism is not likely to make the problem
worse.
The third and only remaining entry presents an attack where attacker D’ spoofs the address
of decapsulator D and requests that encapsulator E install a ﬁlter blocking legitimate trafﬁc from
client C to server S (ﬁgure 3.8.5). This is trivially solved without digital signatures by requiring
a three-way handshake, whereby a nonce sent from E to D must be echoed back to E before a
ﬁlter request will be honored. In this way, even though D’ can send a malicious ﬁltering request,
it will not be able to respond to E’s nonce, since it is not on the path between E and D and will
therefore not see it.
One ﬁnal attack that does not rely on spooﬁng nor abusing the ﬁltering request consists
of ﬂooding the link between the destination’s ISP and that ISP’s upstream provider. Since the
prioritization of packets happens only at the destination’s edge router, it may be possible to
attack servers by ﬂooding the link. Many ISPs may be able to prevent this by moving the place
where diffserv categorization and prioritization occurs from E1 (in ﬁgure 3.5) to the upstream
provider’s edge router D1. As this categorization is static, it requires no active intervention on
the part of the upstream ISP, but it does require their cooperation in order to enable it.
3.2.5 When to Encapsulate?
If packets from a client to a server are encapsulated, should the reverse path trafﬁc also be
encapsulated? If it is encapsulated, should the forward-path encapsulator serve as the reverse-
path decapsulator?
The architecture does not require either, but there are advantages if both are true. If trafﬁc
is always bidirectional through the encapsulator, it can pro-actively limit malicious trafﬁc, as
described in [31]. Short of mandating symmetry, which seems excessively inﬂexible, we can
still gain these beneﬁts if the encapsulator knows which decapsulators will enforce symmetry;
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this can be advertised using the route distribution mechanism.
Should encapsulation be an always-on feature, or only enabled when under attack? The
latter would essentially mean that the decapsulator publicly advertises being under attack, po-
tentially inviting other attackers to cause further harm. Our performance numbers, discussed in
a later chapter, lead us to believe that the best solution is to always encapsulate. This also serves
to publicly advertise which ISPs are being good network citizens and which are not.
3.2.6 Filtering Protocol and Filters
To handle communication between decapsulators and encapsulators we need a new signalling
protocol. The primary purpose is to allow a decapsulator to request a ﬁlter from an encapsulator,
but as we discussed in section 3.2.4, there needs to be more to it than that.
The most important operation is the installation of ﬁlters. The protocol should allow the
decapsulator to specify what the ﬁlter should match, the type of ﬁlter, what action to take when
a packet matches the ﬁlter, and an expiration time.
So what should the format of the actual ﬁlters be? From an architectural point of view, a
ﬁlter in an encapsulator can be anything that stops unwanted trafﬁc with minimal side effects.
It is in both sides’ interest to install the most speciﬁc ﬁlters that actually sufﬁce to block the
trafﬁc, so long as the encapsulator can maintain sufﬁcient state. In the case of attacks which
require a connection to be established, spooﬁng is not an issue, so specifying both source and
destination IP addresses is desirable. In the case of spoofed attacks, the worst case is a ﬂooding
attack on a link, where the source addresses can be spoofed and the destination address can be
any address beyond that link. In such a case, the decapsulator may be prepared to accept some
collateral damage, and request that all trafﬁc from an encapsulator to the decapsulator should be
blocked. In between these extremes, we can envisage uses for various combinations of source
address preﬁxes and destination address preﬁxes.
While the protocol should be ﬂexible enough to accommodate different types of ﬁlter, a
good starting point would be to initially support three types of ﬁlters: a preﬁx-based IP source
address along with a speciﬁc destination address; a speciﬁc destination address with wild-card
sourceaddress, wherebytheencapsulatorwillﬁlteralltrafﬁcgoingtothatdestination; andwild-
card source and destination addresses, to address the link ﬂooding attack above. We believe
these would cover most of the requirements that might be encountered in the early stages of
deployment, and that other policies can be implemented with reasonable performance in terms
of these three.
A ﬁltering request should also specify the action to take when a packet matches a ﬁlter:
besides dropping the packet, the signalling protocol should be expressive enough to at least sup-
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port rate-limiting based on a token bucket, even though such capabilities may not be available
in all encapsulators.
Finally, ﬁlters should be soft-state - they should expire if not refreshed to avoid the ﬁlter
being orphaned if the decapsulator loses state. Additional ways to expire ﬁlters, perhaps based
on trafﬁc levels, could be envisaged too, but they are not strictly required to satisfy our basic
requirements.
The remaining functions of the signalling protocol, as discussed in section 3.2.4 are:
 Nonce exchange. The signalling protocol cannot use TCP, as this would require too much
connection state at a decapsulator under attack. Thus an encapsulator cannot blindly
trust the IP address of a decapsulator that requests a ﬁlter, as shown in Figure 3.8.5.
Instead it validates the decapsulator address by sending a random nonce, and requiring
the decapsulator to return that nonce before it will install the ﬁlter.
 Request trafﬁc marking. The decapsulator should be able to specify a random number for
the encapsulator to include in the encapsulation header, so as to cope with Figure 3.8.4.
 Request encapsulator list. The decapsulator should be able to ask another decapsulator
for the list of encapsulators corresponding to a speciﬁc client address handled by that
decapsulator. This allows for defense against the scenario in Figure 3.8.2.
3.2.7 Evil Bit
Should the “evil bit” apply to all packets, or just to encapsulated ones? This impacts the type
of ﬁlter needed at the border routers of the server’s ISP. If the evil bit is applied only to en-
capsulated packets, router C1 in Figure 3.5 would have to ﬁrst separate encapsulated packets
from native ones, and then set the evil bit based on the peer the packet came from. Border
router E1 would classify all non-encapsulated packets destined for the server to a lower priority
trafﬁc class, but it would also classify encapsulated packets as lower priority if they have the
evil bit set. The alternative seems simpler: C1 sets the evil bit on all packets from ISP A, and
E1 installs a single ﬁlter based solely on this bit.
Regarding where this bit would be implemented, the second solution requires it to be in
the regular IP header, whereas the ﬁrst is more ﬂexible as it allows the evil bit to be in the
encapsulation header, which can be largely of our own design. However, it is unclear whether
current backbone routers have sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to set a bit in such a header, or classify based
on it. On balance, the simplest solution may be to use a diffserv code point in the regular IP
header to signal that the “evil bit” is set.
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3.2.8 Routing Protocol Design
We need a routing protocol to distribute the binding between network preﬁxes and decapsulator
addresses to encapsulators worldwide. But this is not a routing protocol in the traditional sense,
as it is agnostic to the path that the encapsulated trafﬁc takes to get to the decapsulator. Thus
these bindings are much more static than conventional routing information and moreover, the
same encapsulation table should be distributed to every encapsulator worldwide. Even through
these tables may be very large if our scheme is deployed globally, the actual size of the data
is well within the capability of cheap commodity hardware. In terms of a distribution mecha-
nism, the requirement is not dissimilar to that of NNTP[29] or BitTorrent[16], which are both
capable of distributing much larger volumes of data relatively reliably to large numbers of hosts
worldwide. Basically the requirement is simply for each domain to inject its own preﬁx-to-
decapsulator bindings into the routing system, and for the routing system to then ﬂood those
bindings worldwide in a reliable manner.
Obviously it would be simple to hijack trafﬁc for a site if an incorrect mapping could be
distributed, so each binding needs to be secured using a digital signature. To do so, some form
of public key infrastructure is needed to establish a trust hierarchy. One possibility is to use
a hierarchy rooted at ICANN and delegated via the regional registries to ISPs. An alternative
would be to use a multiply-rooted hierarchy anchored at the Tier-1 ISPs, delegated via Tier-2s,
and so on along pre-existing provider-customer relationships. A third alternative would be to
use a model similar to that used for SSL, using arbitrary certiﬁcation authorities as trust anchors
that are unrelated to the routing or address delegation hierarchies. All three are technically
viable, but they have different political consequences; which would be best is really outside the
scope of this architecture. However, we note that the hierarchy rooted at the Tier-1 ISPs has the
advantage that the trust chain matches the existing trust chain of the underlying routing system,
making anomalies easier to detect. The disadvantage is that incremental deployment would be
harder than the SSL-like model which does not require initial buy-in from the Tier-1 ISPs. In
reality a good protocol design might permit any of these options, and the solution used might
evolve as incremental deployment progresses.
Once we have signed bindings, we need a distribution mechanism for them. The prob-
lem is quite similar to that proposed for pushing DNS data out worldwide[25], an approach
called Push DNS. The basic idea is to build a peer-to-peer distribution mechanism, built from
infrastructure nodes such as our encapsulators, perhaps supplemented by additional distribution
nodes. Peerings between nodes need not follow the normal routing adjacencies; they can simply
be conﬁgured between any two ISPs that have a business relationship, or who decide to peer just
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Figure 3.9: Robustness of routing infrastructure to compromised nodes.
for this purpose. The only requirement is that the resulting network is connected. These conﬁg-
ured peerings would then be supplemented by additional learned peerings which would make
the overlay topology richer, so that the overall peer-to-peer network has small-world properties
resulting in rapid distribution of data.
As the bindings are signed, every node receiving one should check the signature before
passing it on to its peers. Thus there is no possibility for a malicious node to inject bad routing
data unless the certiﬁcate chain itself has been compromised. Any node receiving bad data
from a peer knows that that peer is malicious. Such networks are extremely robust to attack
by insiders. The only real attack that is possible is for a malicious node to receive a message
but refuses to pass it on. Figure 3.9, taken from [25], shows how robust such overlay networks
are. In this simulation, each node passes on a message to two peers; three peers; or ﬁrst two
peers, then (after a short delay) one additional peer who has not yet received the message. This
illustrates that the probability of correct delivery is very high right up until the majority of nodes
within the network have been compromised.
It is worth pointing out that the nature of the public key infrastructure (both in terms
of its internal structure and its position in the network) is independent to how effective this
distribution mechanism is. In essence, all that a node in the peer-to-peer network needs is
access to the public key infrastructure in order to sign its data and verify data from other nodes.
The major cost in the peer-to-peer distribution network is then to check signatures. Al-
though this could be done in the encapsulators themselves, it is also possible to ofﬂoad this
checking to a fast server at each ISP. Such a server can also cache which signatures it has
checked in the past, so only truly new bindings need to be checked, even after a reboot.
Our conclusion is that the distribution of the routes and the checking of signatures on these
routes is not only feasible, but also relatively easy and very robust.
39Chapter 3 3.3. TERMINUS ARCHITECTURE
Figure 3.10: Terminus architecture showing the location of its elements. C stands for client, S for server,
BP for border patrol, BM for border manager and FM for ﬁlter manager.
3.3 Terminus Architecture
The architecture we propose in this section, called Terminus, enables a victim to request that
certain trafﬁc be stopped close to its sources. While the architecture described in the previous
section achieved this goal, Terminus does so while greatly simplifying a lot of the mechanisms.
We start from the assumption that the victim of an attack can tell with reasonable accuracy
which trafﬁc is bad. In this section, we refer to the detector as an intrusion detection system
(IDS), but in many cases it may be the server itself. We then deploy ﬁltering boxes near sources
of trafﬁc, since the size of botnets being reported means it is not possible to defend against large
ﬂoodingattacksneartothedestination, evenifthevictimisconnectedtowell-provisionedlinks.
For the system as described so far to be viable, the following issues must be addressed:
 Finding the right ﬁltering box from which to request a ﬁlter.
 Validating ﬁltering requests to ensure spoofed requests cannot become a channel for at-
tack.
 Preventing spoofed trafﬁc ﬂoods from triggering a ﬁlter request that blocks legitimate
trafﬁc.
 Providing incentives for early adopters, and especially providing incentives to deploy
ﬁltering boxes.
From the point of view of deployment, it is critical that the mechanisms will work even
when the ISP of the bot and the ISP of the victim are remote from each other and have no
prior business relationship. The only form of contractual arrangement that seems viable is that
of pairwise service level agreements (SLAs) between neighboring ISPs. Thus any architecture
must assume that this is the contractual mechanism from which end-to-end ﬁltering services are
built. We primarily use such SLAs to distinguish spoofed trafﬁc to avoid the second issue listed
40Chapter 3 3.3. TERMINUS ARCHITECTURE
above. The rest of this section explains the architecture in greater detail, including solutions to
all of these issues.
3.3.1 Edge Filtering
Terminus places special control points called border patrols (BPs) in ISPs, as close to the
sources of trafﬁc as possible (see Figure 3.10). An ISP deploying Terminus (a “Terminus ISP”)
conﬁgures its network so that trafﬁc from these sources is forced through border patrols. In this
way, each BP can later be asked to install ﬁlters for trafﬁc going through it, and, since it is close
to the sources, the total aggregate throughput it forwards should be manageable.
With this mechanism in place, the victim of an attack would have to know which BP
the trafﬁc came through. In a perfect world, this would be as simple as looking at the source
IP address of the malicious trafﬁc and deriving a mapping between this and the correct BP.
Unfortunately, because of spooﬁng, this information cannot be trusted.
This is not to say that currently most sources of attack spoof; they do not. However, this
is likely to change if an effective anti-DoS mechanism were deployed. As a result, any such
mechanism that does not deal with spooﬁng in some way runs the risk of quickly becoming
obsolete.
Although many ISPs perform ingress ﬁltering to prevent spooﬁng, enough do not to pose a
sizable potential problem; the difﬁculty lies in that a receiver cannot tell the difference between
a spoofed packet and a non-spoofed one, so may incorrectly ﬁlter legitimate sources. All is not
lost however; the addition of one simple mechanism avoids this problem.
The idea is to use a “true source” bit, similar to the “evil bit” in the previous architecture,
in the IP header to mark whether the source IP address ﬁeld in a packet is in fact the address of
the host that originated the packet. As the packet travels from source to destination, Terminus
ISPs have their ingress edge routers set or unset this bit depending on whether the packet came
from a peering link to a Terminus or legacy ISP, respectively; the routers would know this
through pairwise contractual agreements. In this way, if a packet traverses only Terminus ISPs
on its way from source to destination, it will arrive with its true source bit set, and its source
IP address can be trusted. Of course, Terminus ISPs are assumed to perform ingress ﬁltering,
either at their routers or their border patrols.
Figure 3.11 gives a couple of different scenarios illustrating this mechanism. Packets orig-
inating at ISP A and going to the server hosted by ISP G will arrive with the true source bit set.
Packets from ISP B, on the other hand, will have this bit unset by router E2, since it knows that
its link connects to a legacy ISP. Finally, any packet from ISP C or D will arrive with the bit
unset, since router G2 knows ISP F to be a legacy ISP.
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Figure 3.11: True source bit scenarios.
Thanks to the border patrols and the true source bit, a victim can now know whether the
source IP address in a packet is valid or not. Naturally, the server will only be able to trust the
source IP address ﬁeld for packets that traversed a Terminus ISP-only path, but as deployment
progresses this will become the common case.
3.3.2 Filtering Requests
We now have control points (border patrols) deployed on outgoing paths to the rest of the
Internet, and a way for a victim to determine where a packet came from (the combination of the
true source bit and the IP source address ﬁeld). When an attack is detected, the next step is to
send ﬁltering requests.
Although the IDS or server acting as the detector knows what it wants to ﬁlter, it does
not know where to send the request. To avoid burdening an already busy system and to avoid
revealing the existence of an IDS, we ofﬂoad this to another system, which we will call a ﬁlter
manager (FM). The IDS is simply conﬁgured with the address of its local FM, and sends all its
ﬁltering requests there (Figure 3.10).
AnFMneedstomapanIPaddresstobeﬁlteredtotheaddressoftheborderpatrolhandling
trafﬁcfromthatIPaddress. Therearemanywaystodothis, butourpreferredsolutionistoagain
use the peer-to-peer ﬂooding protocol from Push DNS to distribute digitally signed bindings to
all FMs worldwide.
The size of this “routing” table would certainly be manageable: only one entry would be
required per AS, or about 20,000 entries in the current Internet. Each entry could consist of an
IP address and a set of preﬁxes, aggregated as much as possible, representing the clients of the
ISP that sit behind border patrols.
Using this mapping table, the FM determines the address of the host at the remote ISP
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from which it needs to request a ﬁlter. Such a host, called a border manager (BM), needs to
forward the ﬁltering request to the appropriate border patrol (in a small deployment, the BM
could be the same host as the BP; the architecture places no requirements on how this should
be implemented). To accomplish this, the ISP could install the necessary mappings of source
IP addresses to border patrols, and update them should these change.
Once ﬁlters are installed we need a way of removing them. Simplest is to include, along
with the ﬁltering request, information about how a ﬁlter should expire. The BP then removes
the ﬁlter when the criteria are met (the expiration could be time-based or even rate-based).
When ﬁlters are installed and attack trafﬁc subsides, the victim has no obvious way to know
if the attack has actually ceased or if it is the ﬁltering mechanism that is being effective. The
IDS could of course request the ﬁlter be removed and measure the effects, but perhaps a better
solution is to provide a way to retrieve ﬁlter trafﬁc statistics from BPs. This allows the IDS to
explicitly remove unneeded ﬁlters, and provides a more ﬂexible tool for the IDS to use as it sees
ﬁt. The ﬁltering protocol described in Appendix A supports all of these approaches.
We now have all the basic elements needed to ﬁlter an attack. Trafﬁc from clients traverses
border patrols and arrives at the server, where a nearby IDS detects the attack, determines the
malicious sources, and sends a ﬁltering request to its local ﬁlter manager. The FM, in turn, uses
the mapping of source IP address to border manager obtained via the peer-to-peer network to
send the necessary ﬁltering requests to the appropriate border managers. These, in turn, ensure
that the requests go to the appropriate border patrols through which the malicious trafﬁc ﬂows,
and where it is ﬁnally ﬁltered.
3.3.3 Protecting the Architecture
With such a powerful mechanism in place, care must be taken to make sure that the architecture
is not used as a DoS tool in its own right; protecting it from such misuse and dealing with other
forms of attacks is the topic of this section.
3.3.3.1 Defending Against Bots at Legacy ISPs
If Terminus were fully deployed, large DDoS attacks could be ﬁltered even if a few legacy ISPs
remained. However, during initial deployment legacy ISPs will be the norm rather than the
exception. Thus, we need to provide some level of protection against attacks by sources hosted
by legacy ISPs.
To thisend, wecan make useof thetrue source bitalready described. Thisnot only denotes
that the IP source address is valid, but it also says that the packet originated at and has traversed
Terminus ISPs. It makes sense for a Terminus ISP to reward other Terminus ISPs, and so we can
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install diffserv classiﬁers at the edge routers of the destination ISP (or indeed other Terminus
ISPs on the path if they wish to do so), sending packets that have the true source bit set to a
higher priority queue. As a result, packets from legacy ISPs will always get lower priority and,
during an attack, potentially little or no service. It now becomes clear that although we always
refer to the true source bit, in reality we implement it as a new diffserv codepoint, so can use
the existing diffserv machinery in all modern routers.
3.3.3.2 Validating Filtering Requests
As described so far, an attacker could contact a border manager and request a malicious ﬁlter.
A nonce exchange sufﬁces to avoid this. On receipt of a ﬁlter request, the border manager sends
a random nonce back to the ﬁlter manager, and only installs the ﬁlter when it gets the nonce
echoed back. This serves to validate that the IP address of the FM is not spoofed (of course this
is not strictly necessary if the true source bit is set in the ﬁltering request, but as Internet paths
are asymmetric we cannot count on this being the case, and the extra validation is cheap).
Validating the FM’s IP address is not sufﬁcient though: it is also necessary to validate
that this particular FM is authorized to request a ﬁlter for this particular destination IP address.
In essence we need the reverse mapping table from the one used by the FM to discover the
BM’s address. The same peer-to-peer distribution of digitally signed mappings can be used to
distribute these reverse mappings too. Likely the certiﬁcation authorities for these signatures
will be the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), as they already handle IP address allocations to
ISPs. It is worth noting that the nonce exchange will not stop an attacker on the path between
the BM and the FM; however the additional risks are minimal as a compromised router can
already ﬁlter the trafﬁc by simply dropping it.
With this in place, upon receiving a ﬁltering request the border manager will inspect its
source IP address. If the mapping between this address and the destination address of the actual
ﬁlter exists in the set of mappings distributed using the peer-to-peer network, then the BM
will issue a nonce. This nonce will reach the FM, which will echo it if it had, in fact, issued
a ﬁltering request. Finally, the BM will contact the appropriate border patrols to block the
unwanted trafﬁc.
3.3.3.3 Triggering Requests Through Spooﬁng
Although the architecture ensures that ﬁlter requests come from legitimate parties, it might
still be possible for an attacker to spoof client trafﬁc to trigger a ﬁlter against an unsuspecting
legitimate client. The list of possible attack scenarios have to do with the location of the attacker
with regards to the victim. Only ﬁve such scenarios exist:
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Figure 3.12: Reﬂector attack scenario. TS stands for true-source bit, SRC for IP source address, EP for
egress patrol and BP for border patrol.
(i) The attacker is in a legacy ISP that allows spooﬁng.
(ii) The attacker is in a legacy ISP that performs ingress ﬁltering.
(iii) The attacker is in a different Terminus ISP from the real client.
(iv) The attacker is in the same Terminus ISP as the real client but behind a different BP.
(v) The attacker is behind the same BP as the real client.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the attacker can spoof the client’s address. However, the attacker’s
packets will arrive with their true source bit unset. The ﬁlter manager must err on the side
of “do no harm” and only issues a ﬁltering request when the true source bit is set, relying
on low diffserv prioritization when the bit is not set. The next two scenarios are impossible:
an attacker from an ISP that performs ingress ﬁltering simply cannot spoof the address of a
client in a different ISP. The attack described in the fourth scenario is easily preventable by
either performing ingress ﬁltering at the BPs or by ensuring that the ISP uses the true source
bit internally. In the last scenario, the BP cannot tell trafﬁc from the attacker and the victim
apart. In essence, the problem is a local one, and the ISP can use ingress ﬁltering or other local
sanctions.
3.3.3.4 Reﬂection Attacks
In a reﬂection attack, the attacker spoofs a high rate of requests using the victim’s IP address,
and sends them to innocent third-party servers; the response ﬂood then overwhelms the vic-
tim. A typical reﬂector might be a DNS server, and the motivation is to amplify the attack as
responses from the server are larger than the requests sent by the attacker.
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Forthemostpart, reﬂectionattacksdonottroubleTerminus. IftheattackerisataTerminus
ISP, spooﬁng is not possible. If the reﬂector is not at a Terminus ISP, or the path from the
reﬂector to the victim is not fully Terminus-enabled, then the attack trafﬁc does not have the
true source bit set, getting low priority at the ISP of the intended victim. However, there is a
single deployment combination that is problematic, as shown in Figure 3.12. The issue arises
when the attacker is at a legacy ISP, so can spoof, and the reﬂector is at a Terminus ISP, so trafﬁc
from the reﬂector to the victim arrives with the true-source bit set. In this case the reﬂector has
“promoted”low-priorityattacktrafﬁctoahigherpriority. Thisscenarioneedsspecialtreatment.
The solution requires an additional system called an Egress Patrol or EP. In practice, EPs
and BPs will almost certainly be the same systems; the difference is primarily that EPs ﬁlter
trafﬁc inbound to customer hosts, whereas BPs ﬁlter outbound trafﬁc. All trafﬁc to servers that
might be used as reﬂectors is directed through an EP.
With regards to Figure 3.12, the process begins when an IDS near server S detects a re-
ﬂection attack (responses are coming for requests that were never sent), and alerts S’s FM. The
FM cannot simply request that the attack is ﬁltered, because if it did, then the responses to any
requests from S to R would also be ﬁltered. Thus an astute attacker might be able to cause
Terminus to block essential communications.
As inter-domain paths are frequently asymmetric (at least for commercial networks, refer
to [26]), S’s FM does not know whether or not the path to ISP B is Terminus-enabled. The
appropriate response depends on knowing this, so the FM sends a conditional ﬁlter request of
the form:
if ﬁlter request packet arrives with TS = 1 then
At EP, block trafﬁc from S to R where TS = 0
else
At BP, set TS = 0 on trafﬁc from R to S
end if
The reasoning behind this is as follows:
 If the ﬁltering request packet arrives with TS = 1, ISP B can use the TS bit to distinguish
packets that are actually coming from S from those coming from A. In this case, we ask
the EP to block trafﬁc whose source IP address is S whenever TS = 0, dropping all of the
attack trafﬁc.
 If, on the other hand, the ﬁltering request packet arrives with TS = 0, ISP B has no way to
tell which packets originated at S and which ones at A. Without adding a lot of additional
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mechanism, the best that can be achieved is to avoid promoting the attack trafﬁc, hence
the request for a ﬁlter to clear the TS bit.
It is possible to handle the latter corner case more effectively by resorting to tunneling,
but on balance it seems better not to add too much additional mechanism, but rather simply to
encourage wider Terminus deployment.
3.3.3.5 Protecting Terminus’ Components
For Terminus to be successful, all of its components must be robust against attack. Attacking
border patrols, for instance, could deny trafﬁc from clients from reaching a server. Under full
deployment, there will be a signiﬁcant number of BPs, and so DoSing a server by stopping
client trafﬁc would prove very difﬁcult at best. During initial deployment, however, there might
only be a few BPs deployed and the attack might be effective. The solution is simple: do not
advertise the BPs’ address preﬁxes externally via BGP. If they are not externally reachable they
are not susceptible to attack; EPs can be protected in the same manner.
Border managers, on the other hand, do have to be externally visible in order to receive
ﬁltering requests. However, these boxes are not on the fast path, and so can devote all their
resources to the control protocol. The BM implementation described in Chapter 5 can not
only service requests at a fast rate, but also ensures that no state is held for a client before
it has responded to a nonce. In the end, overloading a BM with requests only prevents ﬁlter
installation. To allow a bot behind a BP managed by such a BM to continue an attack requires
many bots to DoS the BM; this simply is not a good return on investment for the attacker.
One ﬁnal element of the architecture that might be targeted is the ﬁlter manager. Again,
this box is not on a fast path, and so it can devote all its resources to ﬁlter requests. More
importantly, its trafﬁc is constrained: there are a limited number of IDS systems from which
it should accept requests, and the path for nonce requests from BM to FM will always be
Terminus-enabled (or we would not have requested the ﬁlter in the ﬁrst place).
3.4 Diff Serv
To accomplish their goals, the last two architectures rely on a bit in the packets’ headers along
with some mechanism to prioritize packets based on this bit’s value; the aim is to be able
to cope with spooﬁng and initial deployment scenarios where not all ISPs have deployed the
architectures. The Edge-to-Edge architecture, for example, calls such a bit the “evil” bit and
uses it to mitigate attacks originating in legacy ISPs: such trafﬁc cannot be blocked near its
sources since there are no encapsulators deployed there; instead, the evil bit is used to give
lower priority (at the destination’s ISP) to all trafﬁc originating at or traversing legacy ISPs.
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Since only legacy ISPs can spoof trafﬁc, this measure also serves to mitigate spooﬁng.
The Terminus architecture uses a similar, so-called “true source” bit to denote whether a
packet’sIPsourceaddresscouldhavebeenspoofedornot; packetswhosetruesourcebitisunset
are given lower priority at the destination’s edge routers, and no ﬁltering requests are issued for
trafﬁc arriving with this bit unset in order to prevent using the architecture as an attack tool by
ﬁltering an unwitting victim’s trafﬁc. Further, the true source bit is used to prevent reﬂection
attacks where the reﬂector is at a legacy ISP or the path from the attacker to the reﬂector is a
legacy one.
As mentioned, one clear candidate to implement the evil and true source bits would be
diffserv, since this mechanism already exists in current routers. However, it is worth pointing
out that the architectures do not need diffserv to be deployed: all they require is the use of a
single bit in the IP header and the ability to prioritize trafﬁc at edge routers based on that bit. In
addition, the deployment incentive is strong, since the deploying ISP is the one hosting the vic-
tim under attack. Finally, note that since these bits are there to mitigate problems during initial
deployment, the importance of these mechanisms will diminish as deployment progresses.
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Baseline Evaluation
The performance of a solution against Denial-of-Service attacks is crucial. A defense mecha-
nism that cannot cope with signiﬁcant load can be rendered useless by an attacker, regardless of
how clever this mechanism may be. As a result, solutions should be validated not in simulation
but by using real hardware.
While the last two architectures we presented in the previous chapter have the advantage
of ﬁltering at the edges, we must still test their performance to ensure that they can deal with
large loads. As with any performance evaluation, repeatability is key, and so using a controlled
network testbed is a logical step. However, creating realistic attack scenarios in a testbed is
problematic, since whatever scenarios are chosen, they could never be general enough to reﬂect
real-world diversity. Despite this, it is possible to test each of the components of the architecture
individually to see how they behave under heavy load and pathological cases, and thus provide
some level of conﬁdence with regards to the architectures’ overall performance.
Ideally we would like the mechanisms described so far to be implemented in hardware,
perhaps as part of a router platform. In reality, however, and especially during the early deploy-
ment stages, it is unlikely that commercial vendors will adopt the approach without having seen
some level of real-world deployment. Consequently, we have opted to implement the solutions
using off-the-shelf hardware to show their feasibility, but also to provide a cheap protection
platform in hopes of motivating further deployment. In this chapter we present an in-depth
baseline of the hardware including the testbed used, while in the next chapter we focus on the
performance of the elements of the architectures.
4.1 Testbed
We conducted all performance experiments on the Heterogeneous Experimental Network
(HEN)[57]. HEN is a testbed designed for carrying out network experiments in a controlled,
highly-conﬁgurable and repeatable environment. It consists of over 100 computers of variousChapter 4 4.2. THEORETICAL MAXIMUM RATES
Memory Bus
Model Processor # Procs (in GB) Interfaces Type
Dell 1950 Intel Xeon 5150 2.66GHz Dual Core 2 2 2 x Intel 82571EB Dual Port PCI-e
Dell 2950 Intel Xeon X5355 2.66GHz Quad Core 2 8 3 x Intel 82571EB Quad Port PCI-e
Figure 4.1: Capabilities of testbed computers used.
capabilities, each containing at least four network interfaces. In addition, each of these is booted
over the network, allowing users to change the operating system of any or all computers in an
experiment in a matter of minutes; this also facilitates kernel work, since ﬁxing a crash is as
simple as rebooting the machine and telling it to boot a previous, working kernel.
At the core of the testbed lies the main experimental switch, which consists of a Force10
E1200[20] with over 500 gigabit Ethernet ports. The switch can be programatically conﬁgured
to create VLANs, allowing researchers to setup even complex network topologies in moments.
In addition, the E1200 is non-blocking, so there is no danger of an experiment’s outcome being
affected by another experiment.
Table 4.1 shows the capabilities of the various computers we used in our experiments. In
general, we used the more powerful machine (the Dell 2950) to perform the actual forwarding
and ﬁltering, while using the Dell 1950s to generate and count trafﬁc. As can be seen from the
table, the experimental interfaces in all the computers were 1Gb Intel cards either with 2 or 4
ports, connected to PCI-express buses.
We used Linux 2.6 for all our testing, using a modiﬁed version of the e1000 driver that
contained polling extensions. To generate, forward and count packets we used the Click mod-
ular router platform[40]. Click has several advantages over native Linux forwarding and other
packages. First, it provides excellent performance when run in kernel mode with the polling
driver. Second, it is easily conﬁgurable via its own description language. Finally, should the
needed functionality not be included in the default distribution, Click can be extended by adding
user-created modules.
All performance measurements reported here are the result of averaging the results of three
different runs. The reason behind this is that initial tests revealed that using more runs (as many
as 10) had negligible impact in the values of the resulting ﬁgures. Further, the values for each
of the runs differed very little, thus justifying the use of the averages reported in this thesis.
4.2 Theoretical Maximum Rates
At a high-level, the ﬁltering elements of the architectures are not quite routers but rather “for-
warders”, devices that receive trafﬁc on one interface and send it out on another interface,
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Figure 4.2: Ethernet frame with UDP payload. All ﬁeld sizes are in bytes.
regardless of what the trafﬁc’s destinations are. Like any other device that processes packets,
their performance is highly affected by the size of the packets that they receive, with minimum-
sized packets causing the greatest performance hit. As a result, even though we will present
results for a range of packet sizes, our focus will be on small ones.
Before presenting actual base line ﬁgures, it is worth looking at what the theoretically-
maximumratesforGigabitEthernetareforvariouspacketsizes. Besidestheoverheadsincurred
from the frame’s header (12 bytes for the source and destination MAC addresses and 2 bytes for
the type ﬁeld), an Ethernet frame contains an 8-byte preamble to allow time for the receiver to
synchronize the receive data clock to the transmit data clock; a 12-byte inter-frame gap used to
allow the signal to propagate through to the receiver electronics at the destination; and a 4-byte
CRC (see Figure 4.2). This means that, for instance, a minimum-size packet will actually have
84 bytes when it is on the wire, and a maximum-size one 1538 bytes.
As a result of these overheads, the actual rates achievable are less than 1Gb/s, and decrease
with the size of the packets. Table 4.3 shows the theoretical maximum rate for Gigabit Ethernet
for various packet sizes. It is also worth noting that for our experiments we used UDP trafﬁc
since not only it is cheaper for an attacker to generate, but it is also easily spoofable and so more
attractive from his point of view.
4.3 Generators and Counters
To test the performance of the various elements of the architectures we need both packet gener-
ators and counters. In addition, these must be able to process packets at line-rate for all packet
sizes, otherwise the forwarding ﬁgures might be skewed by bottlenecks in these devices. For
the experiments in this section we used Dell 1950 computers as generators and counters, since
we have a reasonable number of them in the testbed. Each of these had four network interfaces,
and so the goal was to see how many of these interfaces could be simultaneously used to handle
51Chapter 4 4.3. GENERATORS AND COUNTERS
Payload size Frame size Size on wire Theo. Max Theo. Max
(bytes) (bytes) (bytes) (in Kpkts/s) (in Mb/s)
46 64 84 1488 762
100 118 138 906 855
128 146 166 753 880
200 218 238 525 916
500 518 538 232 963
1000 1018 1038 120 981
1500 1518 1538 81 987
Figure 4.3: Maximum theoretical rates for Gigabit Ethernet for various packet sizes. Kpkt/s stands for
thousands of packets per second.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.4: Network topologies, G stands for generator, C stands for counter and black squares denote
network interfaces. (a) Generator performance test. (b) Counter performance test.
packets at line-rate for all packet sizes; we again relied on Click to both generate and count
packets.
To test generator performance we set up the topology shown in Figure 4.4(a). The reason
for using two interfaces for each of the counter computers is that, as we will show later, this
is the maximum number of interfaces that they can receive packets on without introducing
bottlenecks. We ran tests for a set of different packet sizes, ranging from minimum to maximum
size. The sizes we picked are skewed towards the smaller end, since it is these we are most
interested in in terms of performance. In addition, we ran three tests for each of these sizes,
measuring rates in packets per second (pps) at the two counting computers, and averaging the
results. Finally, we repeated these tests for one, two, three and four paths, where we deﬁne a
path to be a connection from a generating interface to a counting one.
As can be seen from the results shown in Figure 4.5(a), the generator can send packets at
line-rate for all sizes for one and two paths (note that only small packet sizes are shown in the
graph for simplicity’s sake; the generator can send at line-rate for all other sizes and all four
paths). However, attempting to send over more than two paths results in bottlenecks at least for
minimum-sized packets, the size we are interested in since it puts the greatest strain on routers.
Consequently, we only use two interfaces to generate trafﬁc for all subsequent tests.
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Figure 4.5: Performance as a function of theoretical maximum rate for small packet sizes. (a) Generator
performance test. (b) Counter performance test.
Figure 4.4(b) shows the network we set up to test counter performance. The previous
experiment showed that a generator can send packets out of at most two interfaces without
bottlenecks, and so we had to use two generators to ensure that any bottlenecks would come as
a result of the counter computer. Similar to the previous results, Figure 4.5(b) shows that the
counter can only receive at line-rate for all packet sizes for two interfaces, but no more. Again,
from this point on we limit receipt of packets on these computers to two interfaces.
It is worth pointing out that we performed both the generating and counter tests mentioned
so far on single-processor kernels. However, we also ran tests using a symmetric multiprocess-
ing (SMP) kernel and multi-threaded Click and also discovered bottlenecks for minimum-sized
packets, albeit smaller ones.
4.4 Linux Forwarding
As mentioned earlier, Click provides several advantages over Linux when it comes to packet
processing. However, performance is crucial, and so we need to ensure that Click actually
outperforms Linux. For the tests in this section we used the same Dell 1950s to generate and
count trafﬁc, and a Dell 2950 running an SMP Linux kernel to perform the actual forwarding
(this is the same computer that we will use for most of the forwarding tests in this thesis). For
these tests we used the Linux NAPI driver, equivalent in functionality to polling driver used in
the Click tests. The network topology is shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Network topology for Linux forwarding performance test. F stands for forwarder.
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The results in Figure 4.7 show that Linux struggles to forward small packets at line-rate
even when only one path is used. Repeating the test with two paths yields worse results (even
a payload size of 200 bytes cannot be handled at line-rate), showing that Linux’s performance
does not scale well with the number of interfaces. In the next section we will show that Click
does not suffer so severely from these issues, largely outperforming Linux regardless of how
many paths are used.
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Figure 4.7: Linux forwarding performance as a function of theoretical maximum rate for small packet
sizes.
4.5 Click Forwarding
Click is a ﬂexible and extensible architecture for building performant network devices. A Click
conﬁguration is made up of packet processing modules called elements. These elements per-
form simple network functions such as queueing, routing, classifying and interacting with net-
work interfaces. A conﬁguration consists of a directed graph with the elements as vertices
and packets ﬂowing along its edges, and Click provides its own language for declaring such
conﬁgurations.
Click schedules the CPU using a task queue. When an element is scheduled, it performs
its packet-processing task and calls a downstream element. This process repeats until the packet
in question is explicitly stored, dropped or sent either to the host or over the network. Thus, the
location of queue elements in the conﬁguration determines how CPU scheduling is performed:
queues that are several elements away from input device elements result in the computer having
to do a signiﬁcant amount of work before it can process the next packet. Because of this model,
the Click tasks (or scheduling unit) in a router consist of the set of elements from the input
network device to the queue, and those from the queue to the output network device.
In Linux, Click can operate both in user level and in the kernel. In addition, Click works
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with the regular Linux network drivers, but provides a customized version of the Intel e1000
driver with polling extensions. Since we are concerned with performance, we use Click in
kernel mode with the polling driver for all our experiments.
Figure 4.8: Dell 2950 architecture.
While we use Dell 1950s to both generate and count packets, we rely on a more powerful
Dell 2950 to actually process and forward them (Figure 4.8). The computer has two Intel X5355
processors, each consisting of two dies and each of these, in turn, containing two CPU cores
at 2.66GHz and 4MB of level 2 cache shared among the two cores. Further, each core has
32KB of level 1 instruction cache and another 32KB of level 1 data cache. The processors are
connected to the north bridge (Intel 5000X chipset) via dual front side buses running at 1.3Ghz.
In addition, the computer has 8GB of 667MHz memory. In terms of networking, the system
has two PCIe x8 slots and one PCIe x4 slot, each hosting an Intel Gigabit quad-port card with a
PCIe x4 interface. Each of these cards contains two Intel 82571 chipsets, each handling two of
the ports on the card.
To run experiments we need to come up with Click conﬁgurations to perform the actual
packet forwarding. For this section, we used two such conﬁgurations. The ﬁrst consists of
a level-2 device that receives packets on one interface and emits them on another one, used
to provide a very basic performance baseline (Figure 4.9(a)). In the second conﬁguration the
device receives packets on an interface, classiﬁes them as IP or non-IP, strips the former’s MAC
header, and then forwards all of them onto a second interface (Figure 4.9(b)). In effect, this is
a minimal level-3 (IP level) device that, for the moment, performs no action on IP packets. We
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.9: Click conﬁgurations for baseline performance tests for a single forwarding path. (a) Level-2
forwarder test. (b) Level-3 minimal forwarder test.
will add our own ﬁltering elements to this basic conﬁguration in later sections of this chapter,
so it provides a good measure of baseline performance.
4.5.1 Multi-threaded Click and Afﬁnities
Running the conﬁguration shown in Figure 4.9(b) with two forwarding paths using the topology
shown in Figure 4.6 results in poor performance, since Click is by default single-threaded and
cannot, as a result, take advantage of the multiple processor cores in the system. Fortunately,
Click provides multi-threading in the form of two elements, BalancedThreadSched and
StaticThreadSched. BalancedThreadSched assigns threads to portions of a con-
ﬁguration by attempting to minimize variance in load. StaticThreadSched, on the other
hand, allows the user to statically assign threads to speciﬁc sections of forwarding paths. More
speciﬁcally, in our conﬁgurations the element assigns either a PollDevice or a ToDevice
to a thread ID number. In the case of a PollDevice, this means that the thread will exe-
cute packet processing from this element all the way to the queue element; for a ToDevice it
means that the thread will process packets from the queue all the way to the output element.
For the StaticThreadSched element, a question arises as to how many threads to
declare as well as to how to assign the poll and todevices to them. To investigate these questions
we designed three different assignment scenarios. In the ﬁrst, one thread is used for a full
forwarding path, for a total of two. In the second, all polldevices are assigned to one thread,
while all todevices are assigned to a second thread. Finally, in the third scenario each of the
parts of the forwarding paths (from polldevices to queues and from queues to todevices) are
assigned to separate threads, for a total of four threads (Figure 4.10)
A further question is how to assign these threads to the various processor cores in the
system. While the simplest choice is clearly to let Linux handle this, we can also set the afﬁnity
of a Click thread. In the case of the Dell 2950, this opens up a number of possibilities, since
threads can be set to run on different cores but on the same die, on different dies in the same
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.10: Scenarios for assigning PollDevices and ToDevices to Click threads for two forwarding
paths. Numbers represent thread IDs. (a) Forwarding path handled by one thread. (b) Input and output
part of forwarding path handled by separate threads. (c) All parts of the forwarding paths handled by
separate threads.
package, or on different packages.
To get a sense for which combination of Click elements to threads and threads to processor
cores yielded the best performance numbers we ran four experiments, covering the cases men-
tioned in the previous paragraph: letting Linux handle afﬁnity, assigning threads to cores on the
same die, assigning them to cores on separate dies but the same package, and assigning them
to cores on separate packages. For each of these four cases we ran the three scenarios in Figure
4.10 (where applicable). For all of these we assigned at most one thread per processor core, and
we set the afﬁnity of the init process (pid 1) to a “free” core, so that no processes would run on
cores handling Click. Further, we used the Click conﬁguration shown in Figure 4.9(b).
Figure 4.11(a) shows performance results when letting Linux handle afﬁnity. As expected,
Scenario 1 yields the best performance (89% of the theoretical maximum for 64-byte packets),
since all packets on a forwarding path are handled by the same core, maximizing level 1 cache
hits. Conversely, Scenario 2 performs rather poorly (32%): not only does Linux tend to assign
the two Click threads to different cores (causing the cache to thrash), but the device is further
bottlenecked by the fact that only one core handles all input for both forwarding paths and
another one all output. Scenario 3 still suffers from the ﬁrst performance hit but not from the
second one, since it uses four processor cores. Consequently, its performance is between that
of the two previous scenarios, 71% for minimum-sized packets.
In the second set of experiments we assigned threads to separate cores on the same die
(Figure 4.11(b)). Scenario 1 yields similar results as in the previous experiment, since each
forwarding path is still being executed by a single processor core. Scenario 2 again results in
poorperformance(58%ofthetheoreticalmaximum), butshowsimprovementfromtheprevious
experiment. One plausible explanation for this is that while the level 1 cache is being thrashed,
the level 2 cache, which is shared by both cores, is experiencing a good hit rate; in the previous
experiment, Linux would schedule threads on cores regardless of whether the latter were on the
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Figure 4.11: Performance as a function of theoretical maximum rate for small packet sizes and different
afﬁnity policies. (a) Afﬁnity handled by Linux. (b) Static afﬁnity, threads on same die. (c) Static afﬁnity,
threads on different dies but same package. (d) Static afﬁnity, threads on different packages.
same die, accounting for the difference. Finally, Scenario 3 does not apply to this experiment
since it involves four threads that could not ﬁt individually into two cores.
In the next experiment we assigned threads to cores on the same package but on different
dies (Figure 4.11(c)). Unsurprsingly, Scenario 1 yields the same results as before, since for-
warding paths are still being ran entirely on a single processor core. Scenario 2 yields 31%
of the theoretical maximum for minimum-sized packets. This is also expected, since it is es-
sentially the same experiment as when Linux assigned threads to processors on separate dies
(resulting in the 32% ﬁgure given above). Scenario 3 yields a value of 61%, slightly worse than
in the previous experiment, since presumably now even the level 2 cache is being thrashed.
For the ﬁnal experiment we assigned threads to cores on separate packages. Once more,
Scenario 1 yields the usual and expected performance. Scenarios 2 and 3 also result in similar
values as the previuos experiment, 33% and 62% of the theoretical maximum for minimum-
sized packets, respectively. This is normal, since in both this experiment and the previous one
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L1 cache misses L2 cache misses
scenario per cycle per cycle
packets do not change cores 0.0070 0.0016
packets change cores on same die 0.0129 0.0013
packets change cores on different dies 0.0119 0.0077
Figure 4.12: L1 and L2 cache miss counts for various forwarding scenarios. The ﬁgures are the average
of the values across processor cores.
the cores being used did not share a level 2 cache, having to access main memory to exchange
packets.
To conﬁrm these theories about cache misses we decided to take a closer look at the CPUs.
The Intel Xeon processors in the test system provide per-core registers called performance
monitoring counters that can be used to measure a wide range of statistics, including cache
misses, number of retired instructions and clock cycles. In order to instrument these registers
we implemented evtmonitor, a Linux kernel module that uses the /proc virtual ﬁle system to
provide an interface to them. For each run of an experiment we reseted the counters, started
them when the ﬁrst packets were generated, and stopped them when all packets had been either
forwarded or dropped. Since the CPU cores are otherwise idle and because we are dealing with
millions of packets per second, we assume that the counters provide a good measure of the
performance of the forwarding process. Finally, we set the afﬁnity of each Click thread so that
it ran in its own core, thus isolating the performance of each core.
With this in place we measured cache misses under three scenarios: the optimal case where
packets do not change cpu cores, another one where packets change cores on the same die and
ﬁnally one where packets change cores on different packages. For each of these we forwarded
minimum-sized packets on two paths while measuring the number of L1 data and L2 cache
misses, as well as the number of cycles where the cores were active.
Figure 4.12 shows the L1 and L2 cache misses per cycle for each of the three scenarios,
conﬁrming our theories. As expected, the ﬁrst scenario, which yields the highest forwarding
rates, has the lowest counts for both L1 and L2 cache misses. In the second scenario, where
packets change cores on the same die, the L1 count naturally rises while the L2 count is similar
to that of the ﬁrst scenario, a result of the two cores on the die sharing the same L2 cache.
Finally, the third scenario has a similar L1 count as in the previous scenario since packets are
still changing cores. However, the L2 count rises, since the two cores are on separate packages,
forcing accesses to main memory.
The clear conclusion from all of these experiments is that to obtain the best forwarding
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performance one core should handle an entire forwarding path. In terms of setting the afﬁnity,
Linux does a fairly good job of this (in the one path-per-core scenario), and so we do not
explicitly set the afﬁnity of Click threads in subsequent experiments.
4.5.2 Forwarding Performance
We now have a clear understanding of how to assign Click elements to threads and how to
set their afﬁnities in order to obtain the best performance results. Going back to the anti-DoS
architectures, we need to build fast devices that receive packets on one interface, apply ﬁlters
to them, and emit them on another interface. Each of these forwarding paths requires two
interfaces, and the hope is that their performance will scale with the number of interfaces and
processor cores in the system. In the case of the Dell 2950 there are 12 interfaces available for
experiments (the motherboard interfaces are used for management purposes), for a total of 6
forwarding paths.
Figure 4.13: Network topology for Click forwarding performance tests.
In the next experiments we investigate the performance of the computer for various num-
bers of forwarding paths. To do so, we use the network topology shown in Figure 4.13, assign-
ing each forwarding path to a thread, and letting Linux handle afﬁnity. For the ﬁrst experiment
we use the level 2 forwarder Click conﬁguration shown in Figure 4.9(a), followed by a perfor-
mance test of the level 3 minimal forwarder in Figure 4.9(b).
What is immediately apparent from the results shown in Figure 4.14 is that the device can
handle trafﬁc at line-rate for all forwarding paths and for all but the smallest packet sizes. In
the case of the level 3 forwarder, this results, for example, in a rate of approximately 4.6 Gb/s
(about 5 million packets per second) for six paths and a payload of 100 bytes; the ﬁgure climbs
up to about 6 Gbps for maximum-sized packets, the theoretical maximum.
What is also evident from the graphs is that with 64-byte packets the system becomes bot-
tlenecked as forwarding paths are added. Placing the forwarding rates for minimum-sized pack-
ets and different number of forwarding paths on a table illustrates this even more clearly (Figure
4.15). Adding the ﬁfth and sixth forwarding paths does not signiﬁcantly increase forwarding
performance for the device; in the next section we look into the cause of this bottleneck.
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Figure 4.14: Performance as a function of theoretical maximum rate for small packet sizes and dif-
ferent Click conﬁgurations. (a) Level 2 forwarder performance test. (b) Level 3 minimal forwarder
performance test.
# Paths Rate (in Mpps)
1 1,432
2 2,843
3 3,961
4 4,975
5 5,068
6 5,094
Figure 4.15: Forwarding rates (in millions of packets per second) for minimum-sized packets.
4.5.3 Performance Bottleneck
Packet forwarding is a complex operation involving several hardware components: the CPUs,
the front side buses, the memory, the memory controller (also known as the north bridge), the
I/O bridge (the southbridge) and the network cards (see Figure 4.8). Clearly any or even a
combination of these could be the cause of the bottleneck, and so we will investigate each of
these to try to identify the culprit. It is worth noting that we conducted all experiments in this
section using the 12-interface setup shown in Figure 4.13 and that all packets were minimum-
sized ones.
Asaﬁrststep, wedecidedtoseewhethertheCPUcoreswherethesourceofthebottleneck.
Since one core is able to forward one path at line-rate, we would expect six cores to be able to
forward six of these paths, specially since we made sure that packets do not cross forwarding
paths, thus reducing cache thrashing issues. Even so, to verify that the caches were not the
source of the problem we again used the evtmonitor kernel module and the CPUs’ performance
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Figure 4.16: Ratios derived from Intel Xeon’s performance monitoring counters for different number of
forwarding paths. (a) Number of L1 data cache misses per instruction retired ratio. (b) Numer of L2
cache misses per instruction retired ratio.
counters. As shown in Figures 4.16(a) and 4.16(b), we measured the number of level 1 and level
2 cache misses for each core and found that these numbers remain almost the same (the graphs
show very small differences of 1 part in 1,000, essentially no change) regardless of whether the
system was bottlenecked or not; this shows that poor cache performance is not the bottleneck.
Having eliminated the CPU cores as the cause, the next possible source of conﬂict are the
front side buses, each of which is connected to one of the two CPUs in the system. Once again,
we made use of performance monitoring counters to derive ratios that directly measure activity
on these buses. The two most important ratios measured the percentage of bus cycles used
for transferring data, and the percentage of bus cycles during which new transactions could
not start because the bus was busy. As expected if we assume that these buses are not the
bottleneck, these percentages were quite small for both buses and saw little change as we added
forwarding paths (we are not listing the actual numbers here for brevity’s sake). We repeated the
same experiment when using six forwarding paths but assigned these to various combinations
of CPU cores and obtained similar results, thus concluding that the front side buses were not
bottlenecked.
Having eliminated the CPUs and the front side buses, we are now left with the PCIe bus1,
the memory controller or the memory as possible culprits. In order to investigate the ﬁrst, we
extended the e1000 driver to take advantage of PCIe statistics registers that are available in each
of the Intel network cards. These can measure a wide range of events, including the number
of transmitted and received packets, completion latencies and the number of lower-layer ﬂow
control packets.
Before delving into these counters, we want to determine where packets are being dropped
1The term bus is a misnomer, since PCIe consists of a network of serial lanes connected by a crossbar switch.
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Figure 4.17: PCIe receive performance counters. For each path and experimental run 30 million
minimum-sized packets were generated.
when bottlenecked. To do so, we used ethtool to retrieve general packet statistics from the
network cards. As it turns out, the received packet count plus the missed packet count equals the
generated packet count, and so packets are being dropped by the forwarder’s receive interfaces.
The Intel documentation for the e1000 driver [17] explains that packets are missed when the
receive FIFO has insufﬁcient space to store the incoming packet. One possible explanation for
this is that too few buffers are allocated to cope with bursty trafﬁc. However, increasing this
number did not improve performance.
The more plausible explanation is that packets are not being DMAed fast enough. We
have already shown that the CPUs have spare cycles available, and so it could not be the case
that they are not polling the interface quickly enough. The next possible reason is a limitation
on the PCIe bus. At ﬁrst sight it would seem that this would not be the case: a card in the
system can forward more minimum-sized packets when it is the only one doing so than when it
is forwarding alongside the two other cards.
The PCIe statistics registers conﬁrm this. As expected, the number of transmitted transport
and link layer packets as well as that of received link layer acknowledgment packets show the
typical behavior of linear increase up until the saturation point, as shown in Figure 4.17 (please
note that the graph contains three curves for convenience, not for direct comparison reasons).
This, combined with the fact that even at the saturation point all cards report that all transmitted
packets are properly received without retries or other costly overheads (no stalls due to lack of
ﬂow control credit, no restransmitted PCIe packets, no stalls due to full retry buffers, and no
negative acknowledgments in the link layer), conﬁrms that the PCIe bus is not the bottleneck.
Memory, thus, remains as the last possible cause of the bottleneck. This makes intuitive
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sense, since it and the memory controller in the north bridge are the only components that are
common to all interfaces, and the bottleneck only occurs when all interfaces are used concur-
rently. In other work [23] we showed that the problem arises from the memory controller hub
having to multiplex short transfers (the minimum-sized packets) from 12 network interfaces to
and from memory, resulting in poor localisation and causing delays as memory address lines
have to be continually changed.
The good news is that despite the bottleneck, cheap, off-the-shelf hardware can forward an
impressive number of minimum-sized packets and can do so at line rate for most other packet
sizes. Even better, future architectures such as NUMA (Non-Uniform Memory Architecture)
already provide a separate memory controller and banks per CPU; careful allocation of memory
to each of these could eliminate the main bottleneck discussed here, potentially resulting in
important performance gains.
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Evaluation of Architectures
Ideally we would like the mechanisms described in the architectures to be implemented in hard-
ware, perhaps as part of a router platform. In reality, however, and especially during the early
deployment stages, it is unlikely that commercial vendors will adopt the approaches without
having seen some level of real-world deployment. Consequently, we have opted to implement
the solutions using off-the-shelf hardware to show their feasibility. In this evaluation chapter
we will focus on the Edge-to-Edge and Terminus architectures since we believe they have the
greatest potential for actual deployment on the current Internet. The second reason is that the
Routing and Tunneling architecture is more suited for a hardware-based platform: at least dur-
ing initial deployment the ﬁltering elements are likely to have to handle large (carrier-grade)
rates, and so an implementation based on commodity hardware might not be sufﬁcient to show
feasibility. Despite this, a lot of the ﬁltering performance results we will present in this chapter
are relevant to this architecture and might be useful when considering deployment in an ISP
handling smaller volumes of trafﬁc.
As with any performance evaluation, repeatability is key, and so using a controlled network
testbed is a logical step. However, creating realistic attack scenarios in a testbed is problematic,
since whatever scenarios are chosen, they could never be general enough to reﬂect real-world
diversity. Despite this, it is possible to test each of the components of the architectures indi-
vidually to see how they behave under heavy load and pathological cases, and thus provide
some level of conﬁdence with regards to the architectures’ overall performance. In the rest of
this chapter we present performance ﬁgures for the various components of the Edge-to-Edge
and Terminus architectures; we leave discussion of these results to chapter 6. Unless otherwise
stated, throughout this chapter assume that the platform for generators and counters was a Dell
1950 (recall ﬁgure 4.1), that the platform for all other components was a Dell 2950 and that the
topology used was that shown in ﬁgure 4.13.Chapter 5 5.1. EDGE-TO-EDGE ARCHITECTURE
5.1 Edge-to-Edge Architecture
The two main components of this architecture are the encapsulator which takes care of ingress
ﬁltering, ﬁltering malicious trafﬁc and encapsulation and the decapsulator, which removes the
outer IP header and can also determine which encapsulators packets. In this section we provide
a detailed performance evaluation of both of these.
5.1.1 Encapsulator
The encapsulator is installed near trafﬁc sources and is in charge of performing four functions:
ingress ﬁltering, ﬁltering of malicious trafﬁc, decapsulator look-up and IP-in-IP encapsulation.
The ﬁrst of these, ingress ﬁltering, ensures that no packets with spoofed IP source addresses
enter the network. In order to be ﬂexible we wanted to support different mask lengths for the
actual ﬁlters, but, at the same time, without taking too great a performance hit.
To accomplish this we built a custom click element called IngressRadixFilter. As
the name implies, this element is based on a radix trie data structure, whereby each edge of the
trie constitutes a number of bits of an IP address. In our case we decided to use a 7-level trie
(not counting the root node as a level), the ﬁrst level accounting for 8 bits of the address while
all the other ones for 4. This allows us to support the most common masks (/8, /12, /16, /20,
/24, /30 and /32) while still having a relatively shallow trie for performance reasons.
To illustrate, ﬁgure 5.1 shows an example of such a trie. Each of the black nodes denote
where an entry would be inserted for IP address 192.168.5.100 for any of the mask lengths
mentioned above. For instance, 192.168.5.0/24 would be inserted at level 5, at the node labeled
5, while 192.168.5.100/32 at level 7 node 4. With this in place, the IngressRadixFilter
element tries to match the IP source address of a packet to the entries in its radix trie, dropping
it if no match occurs.
The second function performed by the encapsulator is the actual ﬁltering of malicious
packets. For this we also implented a custom Click element called EcapFilter which is
based on a radix trie. The difference between this and the previous element is that the latter
stores simple boolean values (essentially stating whether a packet should pass or be ﬁltered),
while EcapFilter stores destination IP addresses, allowing victims to request ﬁlters of the
form <src IP/mask, dst IP>. Further, the special destination address 0.0.0.0 acts as a
wildcard, blocking all trafﬁc from a certain source address, a feature perhaps useful to the local
administrator if he deems a source to be malicious. A more expressive ﬁlter consisting of a
destination IP address and a mask is of course possible by changing the data structure used to
hold entries to a radix trie.
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Figure 5.1: Seven-level radix trie showing insertion of IP address 192.168.5.100 along with all its
possible masks. The ﬁrst trie level consists of 8 bits, all the rest 4 bits.
The last two functions of the encapsulator are combined into the DecapLookup element.
This element holds a list of mappings of the form:
decapsulator IP address ! IP address/mask
These are the signed bindings sent over the peer-to-peer routing distribution network described
in section 3.2.8, and basically describe which decapsulators are responsible for which address
ranges. The mappings are stored in radix which looks up a matching preﬁx for a given destina-
tion and returns its corresponding decapsulator’s IP address.
Upon receiving a packet, the DecapLookup element tries to ﬁnd a matching mapping.
If it does not ﬁnd one, it means that the packet’s destination resides at a legacy ISP and simply
forwards it without further processing. If, on the other hand, a mapping matched, the element
encapsulates the packet with an IP header, setting the new header’s IP source address to the
encapsulator’s address and the IP destination address to the decapsulator’s address obtained
from the mapping. Finally, the element clears the evil bit on the outer header, recalculates
the checksum and forwards the packet. Clearing the evil bit is done merely to show what the
performance of the operation is; in an actual deployment this operation would be done by edge
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routers, as described in the previous chapter.
Putting all of these elements together results in the Click conﬁguration for the encapsulator
shown in ﬁgure 5.2. The ﬁgure represents a single forwarding path, and so the full conﬁguration
ﬁle has six paths plus a StaticThreadSched element used to assign each path to a separate
thread (and consequently one CPU core).
Figure 5.2: Encapsulator forwarding path with custom Click elements.
To conduct the encapsulator performance tests we used this conﬁguration along with the
topology in ﬁgure 4.13. The generators sent packets of varying sizes at line rate, the encapsula-
tor forwarded them and the counters acted as sinks.
In order to make the experiment as realistic as possible we took three measures. First, we
inserted 10,000 random /24 preﬁxes into the IngressRadixFilter. This is equal to about
2.5 million addresses, a number that should be large enough to cover almost all deployments.
We also clearly had to insert the ﬁlters that would allow the trafﬁc to go through so that the
counters could receive it. Again, in the interest of causing the worst-case scenario we inserted
a /32 ﬁlter (per path), thus forcing the encapsulator to traverse all levels of the radix trie when
performing ingress ﬁltering.
For the second measure we inserted 1,000,000 ﬁlters into the element EcapFilter.
Considering that encapsulators reside near the sources of trafﬁc and that the largest botnets
currently being reported are in the order of 1.5 million bots, this number should be ample
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enough to be able to ﬁlter even large DDoS attacks. This assumes that a very large attack does
not originate entirely from sources behind a single encapsulator, a highly unlikely scenario. For
this element we also inserted ﬁlters with /32 preﬁxes where the source IP address matched that
of the generated packets but whose destination IP address did not match, thus causing packets
to traverse all levels of the trie but miss. For the ﬁnal measure we inserted 20,000 mappings
into the DecapLookup element, representing the number of ASes currently on the Internet.
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Figure 5.3: Encapsulator forwarding performance. The encapsulator contains 10,000 ingress ﬁlters,
1,000,000 anti-DoS ﬁlters and 20,000 decapsulator-to-preﬁx mappings.
With all of these ﬁlters and mappings in place we generated packets of varying sizes and
for different numbers of forwarding paths, arriving at the results in ﬁgure 5.3. The graph shows
that the encapsulator performs excellently for most packet sizes, forwarding packets at line rate.
It further illustrates the fact that its performance scales well with the number of interfaces and
CPU cores.
Minimum-sized packets present a somewhat different story (see ﬁgure 5.4). As shown, the
forwarding rate as a percentage of the theoretical maximum begins at 72% in the case of one
forwarding path and holds more or less steady up to four paths, demonstrating that up to this
point performance scales more or less linearly with the number of paths. This pattern is similar
to that of the baseline results presented in ﬁgure 4.9(b), albeit with lower numbers because of
the added work done by the encapsulator.
Adding a ﬁfth path yields only a slight increase in the forwarding rate which results in
a drop in the percentage of theoretical maximum line, while adding a sixth path results in
no improvement and a sharper drop. Again, this is consistent with the baseline measurements:
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Figure 5.4: Encapsulator forwarding performance for minimum-sized packets as a percentage of the
theoretical maximum.
using these additional paths causes the encapsulator’s performance to be limited by the memory
bottleneck described in the previous chapter. Despite this, the encapsulator can forward even
minimum-sized packets at a very reasonable 4.8 million packets per second, or about 2.5 Gb/s.
In order to have line-rate generators, the packets used for the experiments described so far
have all had the same source IP address per forwarding path. However, this can potentially skew
the performance results, since this ﬁeld is used to do look-ups in data structures, a process that
can beneﬁt from good cache locality. In addition, this is clearly an unrealistic scenario: trafﬁc
from clients will normally be mixed at an encapsulator and one has to assume that an attacker
could try to spoof its IP address in order to degrade the encapsulator’s performance.
Figure 5.5: Simple topology to test a random generator’s performance.
As a result, we wanted to see how having different source IP addresses would affect per-
formance. Lacking a hardware trafﬁc generator we decided to create a new Click element called
FastRandomSrc, which, as the name implies, generates packets as fast as possible each with
a different IP source address. In order to test the generation rate we used the topology shown in
ﬁgure 5.5, resulting in a rate of about 525,000 packets per second per interface for minimum-
sized packets; clearly, generating packets with random IP addresses incurrs costs (recall that the
line-rate for minimum-sized packets is about 1.48 million pps).
We then tested the border patrol’s forwarding performance with these sources. Before we
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did so, we tweaked the IngressRadixFilter element, inserting all possible /8 preﬁxes so
that all packets would be forwarded. Under this setup, and using the same number of ﬁlters as
in the previous experiment, the border patrol was able to forward at a rate of almost 3.2 million
packets per second, equal to the maximum rate sent by the generators. This result shows that
the border patrol can keep up with large rates of packets where each has a different source
IP address, and could probably do so at even higher rates had we had more powerful trafﬁc
generators.
5.1.2 Decapsulator
The decapsulator takes care of terminating the tunnel created by the various encapsulators. In
addition, it is in charge of determining which of these a particular source of trafﬁc actually
ﬂowed through. To accomplish this we created two Click elements, TunnelFilter and
DecapMonitor, respectively.
The ﬁrst of these elements, TunnelFilter, begins by looking at whether the decapsu-
lator is the intended destination for a packet. A negative result signiﬁes that the packet came
from a legacy ISP, and so the decapsulator forwards it without further processing. At ﬁrst sight
letting legacy packets through like this might seem counter-intuitive. However, these packets
will have their evil bit set, causing the border router to give them lower priority. If a packet is
not from a legacy ISP, TunnelFilter next checks whether it is an IP-in-IP packet and drops
if it is not, since all packets arriving at a decapsulator from an encapsulator should be tunneled.
Packets that pass these tests are given to the next element in the conﬁguration.
The DecapMonitor element takes care of removing a packet’s outer IP header and keep-
ing track of which encapsulator it came through. In order to achieve the latter task, it stores
so-called monitors in a hash data structure with separate chaining. A monitor is a simple map-
ping between a source IP address and an encapsulator’s IP address, necessary information when
sending a ﬁltering request. While it would of course be possible for DecapMonitor to keep
such an entry for every packet with a different source IP address, this might cause a lot of
unnecessary state to be kept since not all packets need ﬁltering.
A better strategy is for the Intrusion Detection System (or whatever service is in charge of
detecting attacks and communicating this information to the decapsulator) to ask the decapsu-
lator to keep track of malicious sources, essentially installing a monitor. When the next packet
from a malicious source arrives at the DecapMonitor element it uses the source IP address to
derive the key into the hash, checking to see if a monitor exists for that trafﬁc source. If it does,
DecapMonitor extracts the outer header’s source IP address (the encapsulator’s address) and
uses this to complete the mapping in the monitor. Once this is done the decapsulator could take
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Figure 5.6: Decapsulator forwarding path with custom Click elements.
care of issuing a ﬁltering request, or let some other service take care of retrieving the mapping
and sending the request. Figure 5.6 shows a diagram of the full Click conﬁguration forwarding
path for the decapsulator.
Before conducting decapsulator performance tests we need a source of IP-in-IP packets.
While we could have used the regular trafﬁc generators we have been using so far in combina-
tion with an encapsulator, we did not want the latter’s performance to affect the results of the
decapsulator’s test. As a result, we constructed a new Click element called FastTunnelSrc
that sends tunneled packets at high rates while letting the user set the IP addresses of both the
inner and outer headers.
With this element in place we then conducted a quick test to see its generation rate. Since
the aim was to use the same conﬁguration as in previous experiments, we used the simple
topology in ﬁgure 5.5 to ensure that the generator could send packets simultaneously out of two
interfaces at line rate. It is worth pointing out that because of the extra IP header the total size
of the minimum-sized packet is now 66 bytes: 14 bytes from the ethernet header, 40 from the
two IP headers, 8 from the UDP header and 4 from the CRC (see ﬁgure 5.7); the payload is
48 bytes in size. The results conﬁrmed that the generator can send packets at line rate even for
these minimum-sized packets.
For the ﬁrst tests we had the decapsulator process trafﬁc with no monitors installed to get
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Figure 5.7: Mimimum-sized IP-in-IP packet with UDP header with total size of 66 bytes and payload of
48 bytes. All ﬁeld sizes are in bytes.
an idea of its baseline performance. As shown in ﬁgure 5.8, in this simple case the decapsulator
performs well, stripping outer headers and checking for matching monitors at line rate for most
packet sizes. As with the encapsulator, performance clearly scales with the number of forward-
ing paths. Performance for minimum-sized packets is also as expected, scaling well up to four
forwarding paths before hitting the memory bottleneck.
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Figure 5.8: Decapsulator forwarding performance for different packet sizes.
How is the performance affected when monitors are installed in the DecapMonitor
element? As mentioned, the element uses a hash with separate chaining to store monitors. In
the worst case, packets would cause the element to have to traverse long chains searching for
a match. To test this, we could instrument the hash function to always return the same value,
thus forcing all monitors to end up in the same chain and all packets to traverse it, essentially
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degrading the hash to a linked list. However, this would result in good CPU cache locality (at
least for chains of reasonable length), skewing the results in our favor.
In the previous section we got around this by relying on special packet generators that
sent packets with random IP source addresses. However, these could only generate packets at
considerably less than line rate. Since the decapsulator’s performance is largely dominated by
the DecapMonitor element, we can tweak the hash to achieve thrashing of the CPU cache
while retaining the regular, line-rate generators. Doing so is simple: change the hash so that
each incoming packet hashes to a different bucket. The problem with this is that the chains
can have different lengths, and since packets are hashing to different buckets, the performance
results will not be a measurement of any particular chain length. To solve this we once again
instrumented the hash so that all buckets in the hash had chains of equal length.
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Figure 5.9: Decapsulator forwarding performance for six forwarding paths under thrashing and hash
chains of different lengths.
With this in place we measured the decapsulator’s forwarding rates for varying chain
lengths and six forwarding paths (see ﬁgure 5.9). The graph shows that, even in this extreme
scenario where every packet hashes to a different bucket, the decapsulator can forward at or
close to line rate for payload sizes bigger than 600 bytes for very long chains of 100 nodes. For
chains of length 25 the decapsulator can forward almost at line rate even for payload sizes of
200 bytes. For minimum-sized packets and this chain length the rate is lower, but does not sig-
niﬁcantly drop from the baseline ﬁgure given in the previous graph (the forwarding rate drops
from 57% of the theoretical maximum to 49%). In sum, even in the case where
 minimum-sized packets are used
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 each packet hashes to a different bucket causing CPU cache thrashing
 each packet forces a traversal of fairly long chains of 25 nodes
 six forwarding paths are in use
the decapsulator is still able to forward about 4.3 million packets per second, or about 2.2 Gb/s.
While the DecapMonitor element has the ability to decrease chain length by rehashing, these
results show that this operation should not be needed very often, assuming a reasonable number
of buckets is chosen.
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Figure 5.10: Decapsulator forwarding performance with one million monitors installed. The test used
minimum-sized packet and six forwarding paths.
To demonstrate the decapsulator’s performance under a more realistic scenario, we re-
stored the hash’s insertion routine back to normal while retaining the tweak to its look-up rou-
tine to cause thrashing. For this test we used six forwarding paths, 100,000 buckets and one
million monitors, resulting in a longest chain of length 13 (the same monitors were inserted
into all forwarding paths in order to achieve equal results). Figure 5.10 shows that the decap-
sulator can handle a very large number of monitors while still forwarding at high rates even for
minimum-sized packets.
While it might seem that one million monitors might not be sufﬁcient considering that a
botnet nowadays may contain as many as 1.5 million bots or more, it is worth pointing out that
one million is the number of simultaneous monitors that the decapsulator handled in the test.
Once a monitor is ﬁlled with an encapsulator’s IP address and the information retrieved it can
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be erased, leaving room for other monitors to be installed. As a result, the decapsulator should
be able to handle even the largest botnets.
5.2 Terminus
The Terminus architecture has three main components: the ﬁlter manager (FM) in charge of re-
ceiving reports from the IDS and generating ﬁltering requests, the border manager (BM) which
takes care of receiving and validating ﬁltering requests, and the border patrol (BP) which ﬁl-
ters the actual trafﬁc. In this section we evaluate the performance of each of these in turn, ﬁrst
lookingattheBP’sforwardingplaneperformance, thentheFM,BMandBP’scontrolplaneper-
formance, and ﬁnally measuring the performance when these two planes are run concurrently
at the BP.
5.2.1 Forwarding Plane
The forwarding plane of the Terminus architecture is essentially the border patrol. Similar to the
encapsulator, the BP has an element performing ingress ﬁltering and another one for ﬁltering
malicious trafﬁc (in this case called BPFilter, see ﬁgure 5.11). However, the BP has added
functionality to protect against reﬂection attacks based on a conditional ﬁlter of the form:
Figure 5.11: Border patrol forwarding path with custom Click elements.
if ﬁlter request packet arrives with TS = 1 then
At EP, block trafﬁc from S to R where TS = 0
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else
At BP, set TS = 0 on trafﬁc from R to S
end if
While the egress patrol (EP) is logically separate from the BP, our border patrol’s imple-
mentation combines the two by including two new elements: EgressRadixFilter takes
care of the “if” clause of the conditional ﬁlter, blocking spoofed trafﬁc from S to R if the true
source bit is clear, while ReflectionFilter manages the “else” clause, demoting trafﬁc
from R to S by clearing its true source bit (refer to section 3.3.3.4).
To conduct the border patrol’s performance tests we inserted 10,000 /24 ingress preﬁxes,
one million border patrol ﬁlters, 500,000 egress ﬁlters and 500,000 reﬂection ﬁlters (corre-
sponding to the “if” and “else” clauses of conditional ﬁlters, respectively). As usual, we also
inserted ingress ﬁlters that allowed the packets to actually be forwarded. Figure 5.12 shows that
the border patrol has very good performance even for minimum-sized packets.
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Figure 5.12: Border patrol forwarding performance for different packet sizes.
As a ﬁnal test we conducted the same experiment as with the encapsulator, using the ran-
dom generators to see if having packets with different IP source addresses degraded perfor-
mance. The results were similar, with the border patrol forwarding mimimum-sized packets as
fast as the generators sent them, or almost 3.2 million packets per second.
5.2.2 Control Plane
To transmit requests between the components of the control plane we implemented the Internet
Filtering Protocol (IFP) described in appendix A. While the protocol supports various oper-
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ations such as ﬁlter removal and retrieving attack trafﬁc statistics, the results presented here
focus on the most important operation, ﬁlter installation. To test the worst case, we used ﬁne-
granularity ﬁlters consisting of a source and destination IP address pair (though the protocol
supports preﬁx-based and destination-only ﬁlters), and each IFP packet contained a request
with a single ﬁlter. We implemented all control plane elements in C++ and used Dell 1950s for
the border and ﬁlter managers and a Dell 2950 for the border patrol.
We tested the performance of each component individually. The ﬁrst of these, the ﬁlter
manager, listens to requests from an IDS or server. Upon receiving a ﬁlter install request, it
assigns a random request number to it, looks up the mapping between the source address of the
ﬁlter and the appropriate border manager, and forwards the request to that BM. When it receives
a nonce from the BM, it echoes it along with the ﬁlter speciﬁcation, and waits for the ﬁnal
installation acknowledgement from the BM (see ﬁgure 5.13). To test the FM’s performance,
the other components that it communicates with must not become a bottleneck. To achieve this,
we implemented dummy versions of the IDS client and the BM which do the bare minimum:
the IDS always sends the same ﬁltering request packet, while the BM always provides the
same nonce and immediately sends an acknowledgment upon receipt of a nonce reply, without
verifying the actual nonce.
Figure 5.13: Filter installation request using the Internet Filtering Protocol.
With this setup, the FM was able to sustain a rate of 75,000 requests/second. To put this
in perspective, the largest botnet currently reported in the media contained around 1.5 million
hosts, although not all hosts in such a large botnet may be used in any attack. Even for such a
large botnet and using ﬁne-granularity src/dst IP address ﬁlters, the FM would be able to add
ﬁlters for all these bots in only 20 seconds.
The second component to test in the control plane is the border manager. The BM listens
to requests from FMs. Upon receiving a ﬁlter request from one of these, it sends back a nonce
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which is generated from the FM’s address, the request number, the ﬁlters and a secret. When
it receives a nonce reply, the BM ensures that the FM has the authority to request ﬁlters for
the given destination IP addresses (using mappings distributed by the peer-to-peer mechanism)
and that it knows about a BP that can ﬁlter the given source address. If both of these checks
succeed, the BM forwards the ﬁlter install request to the relevant BP(s), waits for an ack and
forwards it to the requesting FM.
Totesttheperformanceofthebordermanager, weconstructeddummyversionsoftheﬁlter
manager and the border patrol. The dummy FM always generates the same request (except that
each contains its own randomly-generated request number) and sends it to the BM without
looking up the mapping between the source address of the ﬁlter and the BM. The dummy BP
waits for a ﬁlter install request and immediately replies with an acknowledgment for it. With
this test framework the real border manager was able to sustain a rate of 87,000 requests/second.
Again, this is sufﬁcient to ﬁlter even the largest botnets in a matter of seconds.
The last control plane element is the border patrol. The BP receives ﬁlter installation
requests, installs them in the ﬁltering element of the forwarding plane, and sends and acknowl-
edgement back to the requesting BM. Once again, we used a simpliﬁed dummy version for
the BM, ensuring that the BP was the bottleneck. For this experiment the control plane and
forwarding plane of the BP ran on separate CPU cores. No packets were forwarded for this
experiment, since the aim was to test the performance of the control plane.
Initial testing of this setup resulted in the BP being able to handle about 54,000 request-
s/second. However, further testing revealed that this ﬁgure was limited by how fast we were
able to write to the ‘/proc‘ directory, which is used by the ﬁltering element in the Click router
to accept ﬁlters. Indeed, this version of the BP was writing to this directory once per ﬁlter,
degrading performance. To improve the ﬁgure, we modiﬁed the BP to install ﬁlters in batches.
Using a 100-ﬁlter batch size, the BP was able to install ﬁlters into the forwarding plane at a rate
of about 354,000 requests/second, an order of magnitude difference.
It is of course possible to increase the batch size beyond 100, but this size already results
in a rate that is more than sufﬁcient to ﬁlter any malicious sources sitting behind the BP in very
little time. Further, as shown in ﬁgure 5.14, this rate does not signiﬁcantly increase with larger
batch sizes. It is worth mentioning that a batch size of 100 means that at most 100 ﬁlters can be
installed with one write to the ‘/proc‘ entry: a victim needing a single ﬁlter could do so without
having to wait for another 99 ﬁlters to come along.
To sum up, the ﬁlter manager, border manager and border patrol are able to handle requests
at rates of 75,000, 87,000 and 345,000 requests per second respectively. While we did not
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Figure 5.14: Border patrol’s ﬁlter insertion rate for different batch sizes.
particularly optimize the performance of any of these components, these results clearly show
that the control plane of the architecture would be able to ﬁlter even the largest botnets in a
matter of seconds.
5.2.3 Combining the Two Planes
For the ﬁnal test, we wanted to determine how running the BP’s control plane would affect its
forwarding performance and vice versa. To do this, we used the same control plane components
as in the previous section while simultaneously forwarding minimum-sized packets on all six
forwarding paths. Under this scenario the border patrol was able to forward packets at the usual
rate of about 2.5 Gb/s while inserting ﬁlters at 345,000 requests per second.
This shows that the control plane has very little impact on the forwarding plane as long as
they are run on separate CPU cores. Indeed, conducting the same test on a uni-processor kernel
causes the forwarding rate to plummet to 78 Mb/s per path (the ﬁlter insertion rate remained
the same). These ﬁgures clearly show that the border patrol can install ﬁlters at a very high
rate without impacting high speed forwarding, and that modern multi-core CPUs are very well
suited to this task.
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Discussion and Conclusions
In the previous chapters we introduced three architectures against Denial-of-Service attacks:
Routing and Tunneling, Edge-to-Edge and Terminus. In addition, we presented in-depth eval-
uations of the baseline performance of the platforms used as well as the performance of the
architectures’ various components. In this chapter we begin by summarizing these results, ex-
plaining why they give us conﬁdence that the architectures and their components can cope with
even the largest botnets currently in existence. In addition, we touch upon incentives for de-
ployment and provide a comparison between the architectures; we close the chapter with a
discussion of some remaining issues.
6.1 Implementation Results
The previous chapter presented forwarding performance results for the encapsulator, decapsu-
lator and border patrol, as well as for the control plane of the Terminus architecture. In the case
of the forwarding plane, these results showed line-rate performance for almost all packet sizes
except minimum-sized ones. What packet sizes are the architectures’ components likely to see?
Different measurement studies give different results [12; 13; 52] depending on where the moni-
tor was located and when the study was performed. The packet size distribution appears to have
strong modes at 40 bytes and 1500 bytes, with a range of values in between. Mean packet sizes
appear to range from 200 to 600 bytes, which bodes well for our implementation, since we can
deal with these at line-rate.
Even in the worst case, if all the trafﬁc were 40 byte TCP Acks (essentially minimum-
sized packets), we showed that we would be able to process this at rates of about 2.4, 2.2 and
2.6 Gb/s for the encapsulator, the decapsulator and the border patrol, respectively. These ﬁgures
are even more impressive if we consider that an outgoing rate composed entirely of TCP Acks
corresponds to a much larger incoming TCP data rate.
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while dealing with a large amount of state. The encapsulator and border patrol, for instance,
forwarded at these rates while having as many as one million anti-DoS ﬁlters. Since these com-
ponents are installed near sources of trafﬁc and considering that currently the biggest botnets
have about 1.5 million bots, one million ﬁlters should be more than sufﬁcient to ﬁlter several
very large attacks (assuming of course that these attacks do not originate entirely behind the
encapsulator or border patrol, a highly unlikely event). We also showed that the border patrol
could cope with a very large number of ﬁlters against reﬂection attacks.
The encapsulator and border patrol also had 10,000 /24 ingress preﬁxes installed, equal to
about 2.5 million hosts. This number need not, in fact, be so high, as shown by the following
back-of-the-envelope calculation. If an encapsulator or BP is sized to handle a fully-loaded 1
Gb/s upstream Ethernet link, then how many preﬁxes would this correspond to at a broadband
ISP? With a 512 kb/s upload speed per customer and an over-subscription ratio of 20:1 (a
typical ﬁgure for ADSL) we end up with about 39,000 addresses, or about 150 preﬁxes for
small /24 preﬁxes. While these numbers are rough, they show that the 10,000 preﬁxes used in
our experiments should be largely sufﬁcient for most deployments.
The encapsulator had additional state: 20,000 entries representing the mappings between
decapsulators and destination preﬁxes. We chose the 20,000 ﬁgure since this is the number of
ASes currently on the Internet, and we would normally expect each of these to have one decap-
sulator address. To allow for growth, we re-ran the test with 100,000 mappings and obtained
similar results.
The last bit of state was in the decapsulator, which was in charge of keeping track of which
encapsulators packets were ﬂowing through. For these tests we used one million so-called
monitors. Relating this number again to the 1.5 million botnet ﬁgure shows the former to be
more than enough to ﬁlter even very large attacks, specially considering that monitors would
normally be deleted once a ﬁltering request is sent.
In addition, we showed that the architectures’ components perform at very reasonable rates
even when trafﬁc is being spoofed so that every packet has a different IP source address. In fact,
even in this extreme scenario the encapsulator and border patrol were able to forward at a rate
equal to that sent by the trafﬁc generators (about 3.2 million packets per second for minimum-
sized packets). In the case of the decapsulator we were able to tweak the hash it relies on in
order to use faster generators; this resulted, once again, in very reasonable forwarding rates of
about 4.2 million packets per second.
Finally, we presented performance ﬁgures for the control plane of the Terminus architec-
ture. We showed that even the slowest components could process ﬁltering requests at a rate of
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75,000 per second. Even in the case where every request contained a single ﬁlter, it would take
only 20 seconds to ﬁlter 1.5 million malicious sources. In sum, the performance results we pre-
sented give us conﬁdence that the components and architectures should be more than adequate
to cope with very large attacks in most deployment scenarios.
6.2 Deployment Incentives
Under full deployment, the architectures would clearly provide signiﬁcant protection against
DoS attacks for all hosts. However, this “common good” argument is not enough on its own
to motivate early adopters, since entities on the Internet generally act only in their own self-
interest. Tobringaboutchange, asolutionmustprovideincentivesevenforthoseearlyadopters,
or it will never see any important level of deployment. In the rest of this section we will discuss
the deployment incentives that ISPs have for each of the three architectures.
6.2.1 Destination ISPs
ISPs hosting potential victims have the clearest incentive, since they can charge for the protec-
tion they provide. Alternatively, such an ISP could provide this protection for free, attracting
customers from ISPs that do not provide this service. Deployment for the Edge-to-Edge archi-
tecture is as simple as installing a decapsulator, including a mapping between it and the preﬁxes
it is responsible for into the peer-to-peer network, and installing a diffserv rule at edge routers to
give lower priority to packets with their evil bit set (we assume the IDS to be already in place).
The routing and tunneling architecture’s deployment is more involved, but still reasonable.
The ISP begins by installing encapsulators at the edges of its network, a function that could
possibly be done by border routers. Further, the ISP deploys a decapsulator responsible for
protecting potential victims. Finally, routes are added so that any trafﬁc intended for these
protected destinations is forced to traverse an encapsulator, and, in turn, the decapsulator.
In the case of the Terminus architecture the process is again simple: set up a box to act as
the ﬁlter manager, conﬁgure it to receive the source IP preﬁx to BM mappings from the peer-
to-peer network, obtain a certiﬁcate to sign its preﬁx-to-FM mapping, and install a diffserv rule
at the edge routers so that packets with their true source bit set receive higher priority.
Although not required, we would also expect ISPs to deploy encapsulators for the Edge-
to-Edge architecture and border managers/border patrols for Terminus, thus accelerating the
acceptance rate of the architectures.
6.2.2 Source ISPs
A source ISP has less incentive for deployment, since it is not directly affected by attacks. How-
ever, in the case of the Edge-to-Edge and Terminus architectures, customers wanting to connect
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to the protected servers will pressure their ISPs to deploy encapsulators or border patrols. Hav-
ing a legacy provider will mean that a client receives lower priority than one connected through
a non-legacy ISP. Not only may delays be longer during normal operation, but also little or no
service will be given if the server is attacked. However, we are not convinced that such customer
pressure will be sufﬁcient, especially in the early stages of deployment, to entice ISPs to deploy
additional equipment. The costs may be small, but they are there nonetheless. Unfortunately,
the routing and tunneling architecture does not have this incentive, since there is no evil/true
source bit.
Another incentive for source ISPs is a potential for a reduction in tech-support costs. En-
capsulators and border patrols should have no false positives - if a receiver does not want trafﬁc,
only then it is shutdown. In the absence of false positives, encapsulation ﬁlters automatically
isolate the bad behavior of a compromised client host, and should require less human interven-
tion than current, mostly manual, mechanisms for dealing with compromised hosts. The hope
is that deploying an encapsulator or border patrol allows the ISP to deal with a bot being used
in a DoS attack at their leisure, reducing operational costs.
The fact that the actual deployment is simple should provide one more, albeit small, in-
centive. In the case of the Edge-to-Edge architecture this entails setting up a fast PC to act as
an encapsulator and conﬁguring it to receive decapsulation routes from one or more peers. For
Terminus, deployment consists of installing a border manager and a border patrol, setting the
BM to receive the mappings between destination address and ﬁlter managers, and obtaining a
certiﬁcate to sign its preﬁx-to-BM mapping.
6.2.3 Transit ISPs
Transit ISPs have the weakest incentive, but may be persuaded to deploy by a client ISP (ei-
ther a source or destination ISP) that has deployed one of the architectures. The transit ISP’s
reputation might also motivate it to implement the scheme. Fortunately the changes needed are
minimal for the Edge-to-Edge and Terminus architectures and require no additional hardware:
just conﬁgure border routers to set or unset the diffserv codepoint corresponding to the evil or
true source bit. The Routing and Tunneling architecture is slightly more complicated, requiring
changes to the behaviour of the BGP border routers as described in section 3.1.4.
6.2.4 Initial Deployment
It is easy to see that with these architectures incentives are such that increasing deployment
increases the incentive to deploy. The question then is how to persuade potential early adopters
to deploy.
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Any site that is attacked has incentives to deploy decapsulators or ﬁlter managers, but only
if they allow the attack to be reduced. However this requires that sufﬁcient trafﬁc traverses
an encapsulator or border patrol, and there is little incentive for that to happen until many
decapsulators/ﬁlter managers are deployed.
One option would be for a large ISP or Internet Exchange Point to offer an encapsulation
or border patrol service, much like a source ISP would do. The site under attack could then
subscribe to this service and all their incoming and potentially malicious trafﬁc would be routed
there to be processed by an encapsulator or border patrol. This would bootstrap the deployment
of decapsulators or ﬁlter managers and then, sometime later, there would be incentive to deploy
encapsulators/border patrols directly at customer-facing ISPs.
6.3 Comparison of Architectures
While the Routing and Tunneling architecture would certainly be effective against very large
DoS attacks under full deployment, it does come with shortcomings. The ﬁrst of these is that the
distribution of routes relies on BGP, putting a burden on global routing, and generally requiring
de-aggregation of these routes. Further, the marking and ﬁltering of packets happens fairly close
to the destination, so that each control point has to be able to handle potentially large amounts
of trafﬁc. Finally, the architecture has no anti-spooﬁng mechanism. Despite these problems,
the architecture may still be a viable option for larger ISPs with many edge routers, so that the
incoming attack can be diffused across several of these control points.
The Edge-to-Edge and Terminus architectures provide several advantages over the previ-
ous one. For one, they rely on an independent and robust peer-to-peer system for route distri-
bution, and so do not put extra burden on BGP. In addition, their mechanisms are much simpler
and provide better incentives for deployment. These architectures also provide important anti-
spooﬁng mechanisms and better deployment incentives than the the Routing and Tunneling
solution.
Terminus has a slight advantage in that it does not rely on an extra IP header to determine
the sources of trafﬁc, and so it is more efﬁcient. However, it does need extra information
distributed via the peer-to-peer network to indicate the mapping of border patrols to sources of
trafﬁc. In the end, this boils down to a trade-off between doing more work in the forwarding
plane or the control plane. In general it is better not to burden the former, since it has to process
packets at high rates.
Having said that, the Edge-to-Edge architecture also has an advantage over Terminus.
Consider ﬁgure 6.1. Under the Terminus architecture, the fact that attacker A resides in a legacy
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Figure 6.1: Edge-to-Edge architecture scenario with encapsulation and ﬁltering being done by an in-
termediate ISP. E stands for encapsulator, D for decapsulator, S for server and R for router.
ISP means that R1 would clear the true source bit, and so ISP C would have no way of knowing
whether the IP source address for attack packets is being spoofed or not. As described so far,
the Edge-to-Edge architecture would exhibit similar behavior. However, it is entirely possible
for an intermediate ISP such as ISP B in the ﬁgure to encapsulate packets coming from legacy
ISPs, clearing their evil bit in the process. As a result, while attacker A is hosted at a legacy
ISP, ISP C can still protect its server S by sending ﬁlter requests to encapsulator E, something
that the Terminus architecture cannot do.
As shown, both architectures have their advantages and disadvantages. In the end, it is
important to note that both of these should be very effective at quickly ﬁltering very large DoS
attacks, as evidenced by the performance results presented in the previous chapter.
6.4 Final Issues
In this ﬁnal section we will cover some remaining issues regarding the architectures. Since,
as explained in the previous sections, the Routing and Tunneling architecture has important
shortcomings, we will focus mostly on the Edge-to-Edge and Terminus architectures.
6.4.1 State Attacks
The encapsulators, decapsulators and border patrols keep different state in order to perform
their functions. Could an attacker insert a signiﬁcant amount of state in the hope of leaving
no room for legitimate state or degrading the components’ performance? In the case of the
decapsulator, the state consists of the monitors used to ﬁgure out which encapsulators sources
of trafﬁc are ﬂowing through. These monitors are installed by the IDS, leaving no vector for
attack; we could of course assume the IDS to be malicious, but in this case it could cause more
serious damage by simply not reporting any attacks.
The encapsulator and border patrol share two types of state: ingress preﬁxes and the actual
ﬁlters. The ﬁrst of these is installed by the network manager and so is safe from state attacks.
The ﬁlters (including the reﬂection attack ﬁlters in the case of the border patrol), on the other
hand, are installed as a result of ﬁltering requests. An attacker could create unnecessary state by
sending spurious ﬁltering requests. It is important to note that this would not be easy, since the
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sources of requests are checked to ensure that they are legitimate decapsulators or ﬁlter man-
agers. Assuming that the attacker was able to compromise such a source, the encapsulator or
border patrol (or in the case of Terminus even the border manager) can keep track of the number
of requests sent by each decapsulator or ﬁlter manager. This constitutes a small amount of state
which could be use to rate-limit the requests. In addition, the requests could be timestamped in
order to expire old entries. The encapsulator has one last type of state: the mappings distributed
over the peer-to-peer network. These are digitally signed, so not susceptible to attack.
6.4.2 Link Flooding
The second issue has to do with actually sending the ﬁltering requests. If the destination ISP’s
link is completely ﬂooded, could this prevent requests from being sent out? Generally the
downlink and uplink are separate, and so the only way this could happen is if the uplink were
ﬂooded; this could be the case if the server under attack was generating sufﬁcient responses to
the attack and the legitimate trafﬁc. In this case the ISP could momentarily shape this trafﬁc to
free up some of the uplink’s bandwidth, letting the ﬁltering requests to go through. Once the
ﬁlters are installed and the attack subsides the ISP can resume normal operations on the uplink.
6.4.3 Compromised Components
What would be the effect of a compromised component on the architectures? We already dis-
cussed how to protect encapsulators and border patrols against compromised decapsulators and
ﬁlter managers. Of course their compromise would also result in potentially no protection from
attacks, but this is a local problem: the compromised components and the protected servers are
all in the same ISP which has, as a result, a clear incentive to deal with the problem.
A compromised IDS could cause generation of spurious ﬁltering requests. Again, the
border patrol or encapsulator could use the mechanisms described previously to prevent this,
or a similar solution could be installed at the ﬁlter manager. Even so, it should be noted that a
compromised IDS can probably cause more damage by simply not reporting attacks, a problem
outside of the scope of the architectures.
What about the encapsulators or border patrols? In the worst case, these could spoof the
sources of trafﬁc, potentially causing decapsulators or ﬁlter managers to issue ﬁltering requests.
Since the sources were spoofed, these requests will arrive at the “wrong” encapsulator or border
patrol. These will have no way of knowing that the request was a result of spoofed trafﬁc, so
they will install the ﬁlters as in the normal case. This is essentially the fourth scenario presented
in ﬁgure 3.8 in the Edge-to-Edge architecture, and so we suggest the same solution described
there. In order to separate the legitimate trafﬁc from the bad one the decapsulator/ﬁlter manager
87Chapter 6 6.4. FINAL ISSUES
provides a random number to the encapsulator/border patrol to mark subsequent packets with;
such information could be contained in the outer IP header for the Edge-to-Edge architecture or
in the Type-of-Service ﬁeld in the case of Terminus. In this way the malicious trafﬁc can once
again be distinguished.
Theﬁnalcomponentisthebordermanager. Ifitwerecompromiseditcouldignoreﬁltering
requests or cause malicious ﬁlters to be installed. Ignoring requests would allow potential
attackers behind the border patrol it is responsible for to continue sending malicious trafﬁc
unhindered. To counteract this the ﬁlter manager at the victim’s site could request that ﬁlters
be installed at intermediate ISPs such as ISP B in ﬁgure 6.11. Even if this were not possible,
at the very least the victim is no worse off than if the architecture had not been deployed. In
the second case, the compromised border manager could cause malicious ﬁlters to be installed.
This becomes once again a local problem, and it would be up to the ISP to restore the border
manager to normal so that its legitimate clients (the sources of trafﬁc) are not blocked.
6.4.4 NATs
In general, NATs with few clients behind them do not present a signiﬁcant problem. In case of
attack, the victim would simply ﬁlter all trafﬁc coming from the NAT’s IP address. This could
cause collateral damage if not all the clients behind the NAT were sources of malicious trafﬁc,
but not a signiﬁcant amount; again, this becomes a local problem: a local and malicious host
causes DoS on hosts at the same location.
What about NATs with many clients behind, as is often the case with enterprises? In this
case the collateral damage from blocking all trafﬁc from the NAT’s IP address to the victim
could be noticeable, specially if the victim is an important server. In a sense, this results again
in a local problem with clear incentives: it is up to the administrator responsible for the NAT to
ﬁnd the malicious sources and remove them, causing the ﬁlter to be, in turn, removed.
While this would give the ISP managing the NAT strong incentive to remove the malicious
sources, such a draconian approach might turn certain ISPs away from deploying the architec-
tures in the ﬁrst place. In essence, what is needed is to augment the ﬁlters to include source
port information, thus reducing collateral damage by re-introducing the ability to single out
individual hosts behind the NAT for ﬁltering.
Introducing such a mechanism would require some changes. First, the IDS at the victim’s
ISP would have to report malicious behavior based not only on source IP address but also source
port. Further, the ﬁltering protocol would have to be augmented by deﬁning a new type of ﬁlter
1It is worth pointing out that this is only a possibility for Terminus if the source ISP has the architecture deployed.
Since in this scenario the border patrol is not compromised, we can rely on its ingress ﬁltering functionality.
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that would include source port information. In addition, the ﬁltering box (be it an encapsulator
or a border patrol) would then have to be extended to support port-based ﬁltering. Moreover,
it is worth pointing out that no changes to the architectures’ routing mechanisms would be
needed, since these would be based on the IP address of the NAT, not on port information. A
ﬁnal optional step would be to establish some form of secure signalling between the encapsula-
tor/border patrol and the administrator of the network behind the NAT. This would serve to let
the administrator know that a port-speciﬁc ﬁlter has been installed, and he could then look at
the NAT’s state (i.e., its mappings of ports to internal IP addresses) to pin-point the malicious
host behind the NAT and remove it. In sum, relatively small changes to the architectures would
allow them to cope with even large NAT deployments.
6.5 Future Work
Like with any other large piece of work, there are a number of directions that could be followed
in order to further improve this thesis and the architectures presented in it. Most of the ones dis-
cussed in this section have to do with initial deployment issues (for the reminder of this section
we will set the routing and tunneling architecture aside since it has more difﬁcult deployment
problems as explained in section 6.3). In particular, perhaps the single most important issue
arises from the architectures’ requirement that a packet traversing a legacy ISP receive lower
priority.
The ﬁrst direction regarding this problem would be to analyze it by looking at AS topology
information from the Internet. The aim would be to understand how the level of deployment
(i.e., the number of deployed ASes) affects the number of deployed paths on the Internet. For
instance, such an analysis would be able to make statements like “with x% of the ASes de-
ployed, y% of all paths are protected against DoS”. This analysis would of course have to take
into account the fact that the Intenet’s AS topology is not uniform (deployment at Tier-1 ASes
affects a much larger number of paths than at an edge AS), but would useful by giving an idea
of how deployment of the architectures might progress.
A related analysis would be to determine how many (if any) of the ASes are purely transit
ASes (i.e., ASes that do not source any trafﬁc), which could be done by looking at BGP route
information from the public Internet. If such ASes exist, ASes connected to them would not
have to change the value of the evil/true source bit, helping the deployment story.
Another research possibility aimed at aimed at improving the deployment story has to do
with scenarios where an AS has one of the architectures deployed, but its trafﬁc happens to
traverse a legacy AS, thus forcing it to receive lower priority at the destination (this is the case
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of ISP C in ﬁgure 3.11). In this scenario we would essentially like some way of “hopping”
or tunneling over the legacy ISP. A simple solution would be ask the source ISP (ISP C in the
ﬁgure) to include a periodically-modiﬁed nonce in its packets. Such a measure would work
under the assumption that the legacy ISP (ISP F) would not eavesdrop the nonce and generate
packets based on it, a safe assumption for larger ISPs such as Tier-1s. For non-trusted legacy
ISPs a simple nonce would not be enough, and a cryptographic tunnel could be used to “skip”
over the legacy ISP. However, the feasibility of such approaches remains to be seen, since
both the nonce and cryptographic solutions would require additional (and potentially taxing)
work from the edge router of the downstream ISP (ISP G in the ﬁgure). Either way, such a
solution would only be needed during initial deployment, and would be removed as deployment
progressed.
6.6 Conclusion
Despite serious under-reporting, the number and size of Denial-of-Service attacks continue to
rise, causing victims to incur considerable costs and threatening their livelihood. Many research
solutions have been proposed over the past years to combat these attacks, but unfortunately they
have presented difﬁcult deployment hurdles and so have not seen the light of day at any signiﬁ-
cant level in the Internet. Commercial solutions also exist, but these are costly and generally do
not scale to Internet-wide levels.
In this thesis we have presented three ﬁltering architectures against large DoS attacks that
aim at lowering these deployment hurdles: the Routing and Tunneling architecture, the Edge-
to-Edge one and Terminus. While different, in essence they all give a receiver the power to
simply ask that the network stop sending unwanted trafﬁc.
Suchapowerfulmechanismmustbeintroducedwithgreatcare, lestitbecomeaDenial-of-
Service tool in its own right. To this end, we have discussed at length possible attack vectors,
showing that in the worst scenarios the hosts are no worse off than if the architecture had
not been deployed at all. We accomplish this, among other things, by introducing easy-to-
deploy anti-spooﬁng mechanisms in the Edge-to-Edge and Terminus architectures. We have
further described the result of the various architectural components being compromised, again
explaining how these would have only localized impact or “no worse off” behavior.
While we believe that the various components of the architectures are well suited to be-
ing implemented in fast routing hardware, in the early stages of deployment this is unlikely
to be the case. Because of this, we have shown that these components can also be built us-
ing low-cost off-the-shelf hardware and open-source software. First we presented an extensive
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baseline performance evaluation of the platform used to build these components, showing for-
warding rates for various packet sizes and identifying an underlying memory bottleneck when
forwarding large amounts of minimum-sized packets. We then conducted performance tests on
our implementation of the various components, giving conﬁdence that these can cope with the
largest attacks, both in terms of ﬁlter installation rates and forwarding rates even for minimum-
sized packets. We have shown that their performance scales well with the number of CPU cores
and network interfaces, which bodes well for our solutions if we consider the current trend in
computer design.
In addition, we spent time describing deployment incentives and initial deployment sce-
narios. We have discussed how the architectures, specially Terminus and the Edge-to-Edge
one, provide clear incentives for ISPs that adopt them early, both at the destination as well as
at the sources of attacks. The architectures are not only incrementally deployable but require
no changes to end systems and only minimal conﬁguration changes to network routers. Fi-
nally, we provided a comparison of the three architectures, mentioning their advantages and
disadvantages.
While the Denial-of-Sevice attacks currently seen on the Internet are severe, there has
not yet been one that could completely take out critical infrastructure. It would be in our best
interest to ensure that we have an architectural solution against large DoS deployed should such
an attack ever take place; this thesis is hopefully a step in that direction.
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Internet Filtering Protocol
The Internet Filtering Protocol (IFP) provides a mechanism to communicate packet ﬁltering
information between hosts, using UDP as its underlying protocol. The protocol has two main
purposes: to allow entities to request installation and removal of ﬁlters and to allow retrieval of
statistics. The latter provides a general monitoring function, but can also be used by an attack
victim to determine whether it is no longer receiving malicious trafﬁc because the ﬁlters are
working or because the attack itself subsided. In addition, the protol provides a simple nonce
mechanism so that receivers can verify that the source of a request is not spoofed.
A.1 Common Header Format
An IFP packet consists of 8 bytes of common ﬁelds followed by a set of operation-speciﬁc
ﬁelds of variable length. The text below shows the packet format as well as an explanation
of the common ﬁelds; operation-speciﬁc ﬁelds are described in the next section. Any ﬁelds
marked ”Reserved” or R should be set to all 0s and ignored on receipt.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version| Op ID | Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Op-specific header fields
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...
| Data ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...
Version: 4 bits
Indicates the filtering protocol’s version, starting at version 1Chapter A A.2. SUPPORTED OPERATIONS
Op ID: 4 bits
The id of the operation that the packet is requesting.
Header length: 8 bits
Indicates the total length of the packet’s header in bytes, including
any options.
Packet length: 16 bits
Indicates the total length of the packet in bytes.
Request number: 32 bits
Used to associate an id with a request. Any replies to the request will
include this number.
A.2 Supported Operations
This section describes in detail each of the 8 operations supported by IFP: install ﬁlters, remove
ﬁlters, nonce, nonce reply, ack, error reply, statistics request and statistics reply.
A.2.1 Install Filters (op id=0)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(0)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filter type | FET | AT | Filter expiration value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Action type value | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...
| Filters...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+....
FT (filter type): 8 bits
Indicates the type of filters contained in the packet. The types of filters
supported by version 1 of the protocol are:
(0) Source IPv4 addresses / destination IPv4 addresses(both 32 bits).
Each filter is 8 bytes long.
(1) Filter all packets that the receiver of the IFP packet is in charge
of filtering and going to the IPv4 destination in the filter. Each
filter is 4 bytes long.
(2) Source prefix-based. The receiver of the IFP packet has to take care of
filtering all packets whose source match the given IPv4 prefix and going
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to the given destination. Each filter is 9 bytes long (4 for the source
IP address, 4 for the destionation IP address and 1 for the source prefix
mask).
FET (filter expiration type): 4 bits
Indicates the type of timeout to apply to all filters in the packet.
Supported types are:
(0) No expiration (requester much explicitly remove filter, FEV should be set to 0.
(1) Time-based expiration, in minutes. The FEV field holds the number of minutes.
(2) Expire if less than x number of packets hit the filter in the last y seconds. In
this case, the first byte of the FEV field holds x, the last byte holds y.
AT (action type): 4 bits
Indicates the action to take when a packet matches the filter. Supported
codes are:
(0) Discard, drops any packets matching the filter.
(1) Rate limit by x packet count in y minutes. Any packets exceeding x
in y minutes will be discarded. The first byte of the ATV field contains
x, the second byte y.
(2) Rate limit by token bucket?
FEV (Filter expiration value): 16 bits
The value associated with the FET code specified (see above).
ATV (action type value): 8 bits
Contains the value associated with the AT code specified (see above).
Filters: variable size
The actual filters (see FT field above).
A.2.2 Remove Filters (op id=1)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(1)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filter type | FET | R | Filter expiration value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filters...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+....
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FT (filter type): 8 bits
Indicates the type of filters contained in the packet (see above
for details).
FET (filter expiration type): 4 bits
Indicates the type of expiration to apply to filters in the packet.
(0) Remove filters immediately, FEV should be set to 0.
(1) Remove filters in FEV minutes.
(2) Remove filters if less than x number of packets hit them in y seconds.
In this case, the first byte of the FEV field contains x, the second
byte y.
FEV (Filter expiration value): 16 bits
The value associated with the FET code specified (see above).
Filters: variable size
The actual filters
A.2.3 Nonce Request(op id=2)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(2)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce....
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
....Nonce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Nonce: 64 bits
Used to ensure that the issuer of a request has not spoofed its IP
address.
A.2.4 Nonce Reply (op id=3)
The nonce reply packet can have two formats depending on the value
of the Reply type field.
Filter install/remove request header (see op id 0 for a description
of the fields following the options):
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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|Version|OpID(3)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reply type | Filter type | Number orig filters/stats |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| FET | AT | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filter expiration value | Action type value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce....
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
....Nonce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filters...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+....
Statistics request header (see op id 6 for a description of the
fields following the options):
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(3)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reply type | Filter type | Number orig filters/stats |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce....
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
....Nonce |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ST1 | Filter1 | ST2 | Filter2
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...
RT (reply type): 8 bits
Indicates which type of request prompted the nonce.
(0) Filter installation/removal
(1) Statistics request
FT (filter type): 8 bits
Indicates the type of filters contained in the packet (see above
for details).
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FET (filter expiration type): 4 bits
Indicates the type of timeout to apply to all filters in the packet.
(see above for values).
AT (action type): 4 bits
Indicates the action to take when a packet matches the filter (see
above for values).
FEV (Filter expiration value): 16 bits
The value associated with the FET code specified (see above).
ATV (action type value): 8 bits
Contains the value associated with the AT code specified (see above).
NOF (number of original filters/stats): 16 bits
The sender of the original request is allowed to send other filters
or statistics requests in addition to the original ones using this
packet type. However, it must be assumed that the issuer of the nonce
used the original filters/stats to compute the nonce, and so the
nonce’s recipient must indicate which filters/stats form part of the
original request and which ones are being added.
Nonce: 64 bits
Used to ensure that the issuer of a request has spoofed its IP
address.
A.2.5 Ack (op id=4)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(4)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ACK Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
ACK Type: 8 bits
Indicates the type of action that the packet is acknowledging. The
following codes are supported:
(0) Installed filters.
(1) Removed filters.
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A.2.6 Error Reply (op id=5)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(5)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error Type | Error value | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filters (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+....
Error Type: 8 bits
Indicates the type of error that the packet is reporting. The
following codes are supported:
(0) Not responsible for given sources, cannot install/remove filters.
Filters in packet represent those that could not be installed. EV
field has filter type code.
(1) Too many filters, cannot install. Filters in packet represent those
that could not be installed. EV field has filter type code.
(2) Please resend request in EV seconds.
(3) Protocol version not supported.
(4) Incorrect nonce received.
EV (Error Value): 16 bits
The value associated with the Error Type code specified (see above).
A.2.7 Statistics Request (op id=6)
This command is used to request statistics about particular filters. One
packet may request different statistics from various filters, although
all filters in the packet must be of the same type. Note that the fields
labeled FilterN are variable, even though they’re shown below to be 8
bits long.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(6)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filter Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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| ST1 | Filter1 | ST2 | Filter2
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...
FT (filter type): 8 bits
Indicates the type of filters contained in the packet (see above
for details).
ST (Statistic type): 8 bits
Indicates the type of measurement that is required for each of the
filters in the packet. Supported types are:
(0) Packet count since filter installation.
(1) Packet count since last reading.
(2) Current rate in packets per second. The reply will contain two
fields, one for the number of packets, and the other for the
measurement time window, in seconds.
(3) All of the above.
Filters: variable size
The filters to get statistics for.
A.2.8 Statistics Reply (op id=7)
This packet consists of a list of filters, each followed by the value of
the measurement done for that particular filter.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Version|OpID(7)| Header Length | Packet length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Request number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filter Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Options (if any)...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Filter1 | ST1 | Filter1 measurement...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-...
FT (filter type): 8 bits
Indicates the type of filters contained in the packet (see above
for details).
Filter: variable
See above for filter types.
ST (Statistic type): 8 bits
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Indicates the type of measurement that is required for each of the
filters in the packet (see above for details). Please note that a
measurement field value of all 1s will indicate that the host
containing the filters does not support the statistic type requested.
Filter measurement: variable
The length and format of the measurement field depends highly on the
value of the ST type:
(0) Packet count since filter installation.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ST(0) | Packet count...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...Packet count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
(1) Packet count since last reading.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ST(1) | Packet count...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...Packet count |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The count used for the number of packets is 4 bytes long. The sender
of the statistics request packet should be aware that this value might
wrap.
(2) Current rate in packets per second.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ST(2) | Packet count...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...Packet count | Measurement time
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...Meas. time |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The count used for the number of packets is 4 bytes long. The sender
of the statistics request packet should be aware that this value might
wrap. The measurement time is 4 bytes long and is assumed to be in
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seconds. The rate is simply the packet count divided by the measurement
time.
(3) All of the above.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ST(3) | Packet count since filter installation...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...Packet count | Packet count since last reading...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...Packet count | Rate packet count...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
...Packet count | Measurement time
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-++-
...Meas. time |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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